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A battle is brewing for control of America’s most dynamic 
companies. Entrepreneurs are increasingly seeking protection 
from interference or dismissal by public investors through the 
adoption of dual-class stock structures in initial public 
offerings. Institutional investors are pushing back, demanding 
that such structures be abandoned or strictly limited through 
sunset provisions. The actual terms of dual-class stock 
structures, however, have been remarkably understudied, so 
the debate between proponents of prohibition and private 
ordering is often ill-informed. This paper presents the first 
empirical analysis of the initial, or sunrise, and terminal, or 
sunset, provisions found in the charters of dual-class 
companies, with a data set of 139 U.S. public companies. 
Careful selection of such provisions can satisfy both the desire 
of entrepreneurs to pursue their idiosyncratic visions for value 
creation without fear of interference or dismissal and the need 
of investors for a voice to ensure management accountability. 
Private law firms representing entrepreneurs in initial public 
offerings play a critical role in the selection of charter 
provisions, so the onus is on such firms to ensure that private 
ordering produces a satisfactory resolution before momentum 
builds for a regulatory solution to investors’ concerns. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A modern-day struggle for control of America’s most 
dynamic companies is brewing between entrepreneurs and 
institutional investors. American entrepreneurs are 
increasingly using dual-class stock structures, which allow 
them to retain voting control of their companies even after 
going public, to obtain protection from interference or 
dismissal by institutional investors and activist shareholders. 
The adoption of dual-class share structures among companies 
conducting initial public offerings (“IPOs”) in the United 
States has rapidly accelerated in recent years, from a few 
companies per year in the early 2000s to many times that 
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number in the last seven years.1 The data set2 of dual-class 
companies described in this paper identifies seventy-two 
companies that adopted a dual-class structure between 2010 
and 2017, including some of the largest IPOs and most 
familiar names in America: Facebook, GoPro, Groupon, 
LinkedIn, Square, TripAdvisor, Yelp, Zillow, and Zynga. On 
March 1, 2017, Snap, Inc. (“Snap”), owner of the popular 
Snapchat app, made headlines by going public—in the most 
anticipated technology IPO since Facebook’s IPO in 2012— 
with a multi-class structure featuring no-vote shares for the 
new public shareholders.3 
 
1 See Alice Gomstyn, Supervoters, Stocks, and Silicon Valley: What 
Investors Should Know About Dual-Class Voting Structures, THE MOTLEY 
FOOL (Dec. 5, 2015, 9:10 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general 
/2015/12/05/supervoters-stocks-and-silicon-valley-what-investo.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QRM7-ACW6] (“A growing number of U.S. firms have 
adopted [the dual-class] structure: Between 2013 and late 2015, 98 
companies newly listed on U.S. exchanges had dual-class IPOs, compared 
to 59 between 2010 and 2012, according to data from information provider 
Dealogic.”); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars 
to Have Less of a Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook 
/shareholders-vote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html 
[https://perma.cc/FSC8-NGGY] (“More than 13.5 percent of the 133 
companies listing shares on United States exchanges in 2015 have set up a 
dual-class structure, according to the data provider Dealogic. That 
compares with 12 percent last year and just 1 percent in 2005.”). 
2 This Article is substantially based on a data set created by the 
author—Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review)—which is detailed infra Part II. The full 
data set is on file with the Columbia Business Law Review. The Appendix, 
infra, includes a full list of the companies included in the data set as well as 
several tables summarizing various features of the data. In an effort to 
ensure readability and avoid an excessive use of citations, the Columbia 
Business Law Review opted not to cite to the data set each time the author 
refers to it, but only when particularly relevant. 
3 See Maureen Farrell, Snap IPO Limits Vote to Founders, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 17, 2017, at B1; Steven Davidoff Solomon, When Snap Goes Public, 
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Entrepreneurs are often creative visionaries who continue 
to develop new ideas and products as their companies grow. 
The dual-class structure allows them to pursue their vision for 
creating corporate value without the threat of their ideas 
being overruled or dismissed by investors who may have less 
patience for brilliance to manifest than profit. The ghost of 
Steve Jobs looms large in Silicon Valley, in particular. 
Founder-entrepreneurs express concern that efforts to recruit 
and retain the most talented employees and invest in research 
and development for long-term gains may not be understood 
or appreciated by markets in the short-term.4 On the other 
hand, investors are concerned that, with dual-class stock 
structures, especially those involving no-vote shares, expected 
long-term value will not be realized and corporate assets may 
be wasted.5 In these contexts, dual-class stock structures 
leave them with no voice to lobby for changes in policies or 
management and exempting companies from the market for 
corporate control, which otherwise operates as a check on 
management. 
Alarmed by the increase in dual-class companies, but 
unable to prevent successful companies from utilizing dual-
class structures when they come to market, institutional 
investors and proxy advisors have mounted a concerted 
campaign to pressure regulators to prohibit dual-class 
structures and companies to abandon them. T. Rowe Price 
announced in March 2016 that it will vote shares held by its 
mutual funds against the lead independent directors and all 
nominating committee members of companies with dual-class 
share structures in future annual meetings.6 Institutional 
 
4 See Paresh Dave, Snap’s Nonvoting Stock  — Everything Sold in the 
IPO — Is Junk, Investor Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 09, 2017, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snap-no-vote-shares-
20170309-story.html [https://perma.cc/9MEM-BN7F]. 
5 See id. 
6 Lorraine Mirabella, T. Rowe Price Takes Stand Against Stock 
Structures That Create Unequal Shareholder Rights, BALT. SUN (Mar. 19, 
2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-t-rowe-price-oppose-
dual-class-stock-20160319-story.html (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review). 
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Shareholder Services (“ISS”) announced in November 2016 
that for the 2017 proxy season, it would encourage investors 
to vote against the boards of directors of companies with dual-
class share structures unless they have a “reasonable” sunset 
mechanism, and requested comments from investors as to 
what constitutes a reasonable sunset mechanism.7 On 
January 31, 2017, the Investor Stewardship Group, an 
organization of influential institutional investors holding an 
aggregate of $17 trillion in assets under management, 
announced its new corporate governance principles,8 which 
require the directors of public companies with dual-class 
shares to “end or phase out controlling structures at the 
appropriate time.”9 
 
7  Lyuba Goltser, ISS Proposes New 2017 Voting Policies, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/02/iss-proposes-new-2017-voting-
policies [https://perma.cc/BJF6-BMST]; US Policy – Unilateral Board 
Actions – Multi Class Capital Structure at IPO, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVS., https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/ 
unilateral-board-actions-multi-class-capital-structure-at-ipo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5MM-EF6U]. 
8 Leading Investors Launch Historic Initiative Focused on U.S. 
Institutional Investor Stewardship and Corporate Governance, BUS. WIRE 
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20170131005949/en/Leading-Investors-Launch-Historic-Initiative-
Focused-U.S [https://perma.cc/YVY3-2HXQ]. Led by senior corporate 
governance practitioners at institutional investor and investment 
management firms, the initial members of the Investor Stewardship Group 
were: BlackRock, CalSTRS, Florida State Board of Administration, GIC 
Private Limited (Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Fund), Legal and General 
Investment Management, MFS Investment Management, MN Netherlands, 
PGGM, Royal Bank of Canada Global Asset Management, State Street 
Global Advisors, TIAA Investments, T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc., 
ValueAct Capital, Vanguard, Washington State Investment Board, and 
Wellington Management. Id. 
9 The relevant principle states, in its entirety: 
Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights 
in proportion to their economic interest. 
2.1 Companies should adopt a one-share, one-vote standard 
and avoid adopting share structures that create unequal 
voting rights among their shareholders. 
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So the battle lines between entrepreneurs and investors 
have been drawn and the stakes are high—absent fraud or 
self-dealing, Delaware corporate law generally upholds the 
choices of the corporate party or parties with the most votes.10 
There is an urgent need for American lawyers to consider how 
the respective needs of entrepreneurs and investors can be 
satisfied to end the impasse. It is difficult to have an informed 
and productive conversation about how to respond to the dual-
class phenomenon, however, without a thorough 
understanding of the actual terms of dual-class stock 
structures.11 Even the most lopsided dual-class structure—
one with no-vote public shares—might be acceptable, for 
instance, if it ends after a short period of years or once the 
stock price performance falls below a certain level for a set 
period of time. 
The terms of dual-class stock structures have been 
remarkably understudied. This paper fills this gap in the 
literature with a taxonomy and census of the initial, or 
sunrise, and terminal, or sunset, provisions for 139 U.S. public 
companies with dual-class stock structures. This review of 
dual-class terms reveals that there are myriad possibilities for 
satisfying the needs of both founders and investors in the 
 
2.2 Boards of companies that already have dual or multiple 
class share structures are expected to review these 
structures on a regular basis or as company circumstances 
change, and establish mechanisms to end or phase out 
controlling structures at the appropriate time, while 
minimizing costs to shareholders. 
Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies, INV. 
STEWARDSHIP GROUP, https://www.isgframework.org/corporate-governance-
principles [https://perma.cc/J9DS-ZF43]. 
10 See, e.g., Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994); Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).  
11 As Ronald Gilson noted, “To better understand the macroeconomic 
impact of efficient controlling shareholder systems, we need to better 
understand the micro-level dynamics of this ownership structure. As the 
focus of corporate governance scholarship shifts to controlling shareholder 
systems, we need to think small.” Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling 
Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1678–79 (2006). 
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dual-class form. As described in this paper, companies 
adopting dual-class structures have utilized a variety of 
sunrise and sunset provisions in the past, and dual-class stock 
structures have become more investor-friendly over time, 
particularly in the last decade as use of the structure has 
proliferated among technology companies. It is also possible 
to imagine additional charter provisions that could be used to 
satisfy both the entrepreneurs’ need for control and the 
investors’ need for influence. When the existing and possible 
future options are fully understood and considered, law firms 
representing companies pursuing initial public offerings can 
and should design multi-class stock structures that weave 
together the disparate expectations of entrepreneurs and 
investors, making resort to regulatory limitation or 
prohibition unnecessary.  
Part II of this paper describes the hand collected data set 
created to analyze the existing dual-class sunrise and sunset 
provisions among public companies in the United States. Part 
III describes the sunrise provisions of dual-class structures—
such as the respective voting rights of the high vote and low 
vote shares. Part IV describes the sunset provisions of the 
companies in the data set. Part V explains the influence of law 
firms acting as issuer’s counsel on the design of dual-class 
structures used in recent IPOs in the United States. Part VI 
discusses standards for evaluating dual-class stock 
structures, describing the theoretical background to the 
positions taken by entrepreneurs and investors. It then 
suggests alternative standards for evaluating dual-class stock 
structures based on the fundamental motives of the parties—
entrepreneurs seek control in order to pursue their 
idiosyncratic visions for creating value,12 while investors seek 
control for influence, voice, and management accountability in 
order to minimize diminutions in corporate value through 
management agency costs.13 Finally, Part VII discusses 
optimal dual-class share structures, evaluating the various 
 
12 Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and 
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565–66 (2016). 
13 Id. at 569, 576–83. 
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structures in use today and suggesting possible modifications 
in light of the standards discussed in Part VI. 
II. THE DUAL-CLASS DATA SET  
Despite the controversy over dual-class stock structures, 
the actual terms used by such stock structures are remarkably 
understudied. In order to promote an informed discussion of 
these structures, I created a hand-collected data set of the 
sunrise (initial) and sunset (terminal) charter provisions used 
by public companies adopting dual-class stock structures. To 
keep the number of companies in the data set to a manageable 
number, I used slightly different criteria for inclusion of 
twentieth and twenty-first century corporations. Among 
companies that went public with dual-class stock structures 
before 2000, the data set focuses on large- and mid-cap 
companies (S&P 500, S&P 400, and Russell 1000 stocks). This 
excludes smaller, less dynamic controlled companies that are 
arguably more like close corporations, and includes most of 
the market value represented by dual-class companies.14 
Among companies that have gone public since 2000, the data 
set also includes small-cap (S&P 600, Russell 2000) and 
unindexed companies, which are earlier in their corporate 
lifecycles. Much of the innovation in dual-class stock 
structures has occurred in the last ten to fifteen years, so it 
was also important to be more inclusive for more recent years 
in order to accurately capture the proliferation of creative 
sunrise and sunset structures.  
To identify companies with dual-class stock structures, I 
started with the list of S&P 1500 controlled companies created 
by ISS on behalf of the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center Institute (“IRRCi”).15 Most of the companies that 
 
14 The Russell 1000 represents more than ninety percent of the market 
capitalization of the companies in the Russell 3000, with the Russell 2000 




15 EDWARD KAMONJOH, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., CONTROLLED 
COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF 
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conducted dual-class IPOs in recent years are not included in 
the IRRCi study because they are not included in the S&P 
1500. To identify more recent dual-class market entrants, I 
reviewed the charters of companies with “unequal voting” 
provisions in the Takeover Defense database of 
SharkRepellent.net provided by FactSet.16 Many of the 
companies in the SharkRepellent database were not actually 
dual-class companies giving founders unequal voting rights, 
which highlights the need for careful selection of the data set 
when creating regression analyses of “dual-class” companies 
or doing other empirical research based on these databases.17 
 
PERFORMANCE AND RISK 84–90 (2016). A significant number of the controlled 
companies in the IRRCi S&P 1500 data set created by ISS were S&P 600 
small-cap companies that went public before the year 2000 and were 
eliminated from the data set as explained supra text accompanying note 14. 
16 The SharkRepellent.net database, as of December 17, 2017, included 
357 companies with unequal voting provisions, 183 of which were Russell 
2000 companies, 111 of which were Russell 1000 companies, 38 of which 
were S&P 500 companies and 35 of which were S&P 400 companies. More 
than half of the companies in the SharkRepellent.net database were Russell 
2000 companies that went public before 2000 and were therefore eliminated 
from review. See FactSet Research Systems, Inc., SHARKREPELLENT.NET, 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/23GE-LETN]. 
17 A large number of the companies identified by SharkRepellent.net 
as having unequal voting rights are not dual-class companies in the 
traditional sense because the unequal voting provisions were not created to 
give company insiders greater voting power than their cash-flow rights. 
Companies have multiple classes of voting or non-voting common stock for 
a variety of reasons unrelated to enhancing the rights of founders. Some 
companies identified by the database, such as Aflac, Inc., Carlisle 
Companies, Inc., Synovus Financial Corp., and The J.M. Smucker Co., 
employ tenure voting systems, rather than a fixed dual-class system. A 
significant number of companies, particularly in the financial services 
industry, have unlisted non-voting shares to permit certain investors to 
satisfy regulatory limitations on their voting rights in the firm. Others are 
yieldcos or other subsidiaries whose control shares are held by corporate 
parents. Still other companies have “supervoting” shares to effectively allow 
shareholders of Canadian subsidiaries to have a number of votes at the U.S. 
parent equal to the number of votes they would otherwise have at the 
subsidiary level.  Finally, numerous companies in the unequal voting data 
base have multiple classes of common equity to facilitate an Up-C IPO 
structure. In an Up-C IPO, pre-IPO owners retain flow-through tax benefits 
by retaining their economic interest in an existing partnership or LLC 
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Finally, I compared my list with the list published by the 
Council of Institutional Investors in March 2017 to establish 
a final data set of the charter terms of 139 dual-class 
companies.18 
After identifying companies with multiple classes of 
disparately voting common shares, I hand-collected 
information regarding the dual-class sunrise and sunset 
provisions included in the articles or certificates of 
incorporation (collectively, “charters”) of such companies filed 
as exhibits in the Security and Exchange Commission’s 
(“SEC’s”) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(“EDGAR”) system in order to create the dual-class data set.19 
A full list of the companies I included in the data set, listed by 
the year in which they went public, or, where known, 
otherwise adopted a dual-class structure, is included as 
Appendix A.20 Appendix B contains summary tables of sunset 
 
operating entity. Public shareholders are offered shares of a listco 
corporation which acquires membership interests in the LLC equal to the 
public ownership interest. Pre-IPO investors get a separate class of equity 
in the listco which typically gives them listco voting rights equal to their 
economic interest in the LLC but no economic claim on the corporation. 
Thus, Up-C IPOs in which founders control the listco are generally more 
like concentrated ownership structures than dual-class structures. I 
excluded all of these companies with “unequal” voting rights from the dual-
class data set. While I do not have access to the Dealogic database, I suspect 
the Dealogic statistics regarding the number of dual-class IPOs in recent 
years cited by the articles listed supra, note 1, inflate the actual number of 
dual-class IPOs by including some of the same categories of non-dual-class 
firms with multiple classes of common equity included in the 
SharkRepellent.net database. 
18 The Council of Institutional Investors list of dual-class companies is 
available on the CII website. Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INV., https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/UJN6-F7V2]. 
19 This includes both companies with high vote and low vote common 
stock and companies with voting and non-voting common stock, as well as 
a few companies, such as Alphabet, Discovery Communications and Under 
Armour, with high vote, low vote, and non-voting common stock.  
20 While I generally did not include former dual-class companies that 
are no longer public, because it is more difficult to identify them and obtain 
information about their dual-class structures in currently available 
databases, I did include a few companies that have been acquired in recent 
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provisions employed by those companies, and Appendix C 
contains lists of firms with certain relevant characteristics. 
The full data set is on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review. 
As will become immediately apparent upon perusing the 
list of companies in Appendix A, dual-class adoption in the 
twentieth century was by no means limited primarily to 
companies in journalism and media (as has been commonly 
understood) and twenty-first century adoption has by no 
means been limited to technology companies, although the 
adoption of dual-class structures by increasing numbers of 
technology companies is largely responsible for the rapid 
increase in the number of dual-class companies in the last 
seven years. 
III. SUNRISE PROVISIONS 
The initial structural, or sunrise, provisions of a dual-class 
stock structure focus on the differing rights of multiple classes 
of common stock, most importantly, the general voting and 
director election rights. Generally speaking, the other rights 
of the different classes of common stock, such as the right to 
receive dividends, are indistinguishable. Many of the 
companies in the data set also protect low vote shareholders 
in change of control transactions by giving all classes the same 
consideration upon a change of control or giving low vote 
shares a separate vote on such transactions unless the 
consideration is the same.21 
 
years for which such information was readily available, such as Cablevision, 
DreamWorks, Kayak.com and Molex. See infra Appendix A. 
21 These dividend and merger equity provisions are consistent with the 
prediction of Goshen and Hamdani’s idiosyncratic vision theory that 
founders seek control not to extract private benefits of control, but rather to 
protect their ability to pursue their visions for creating above market 
returns to be shared ratably with all equity holders, as discussed infra Part 
V. See generally Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12. 
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A. Historical Background to Sunrise Provisions 
The current New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and 
Nasdaq rules do not impose any specific requirements for the 
sunrise or sunset provisions of dual-class structures—they 
only prohibit the mid-course adoption of classes of equity that 
dilute the voting power of existing shareholders.22 While the 
NYSE generally prohibited dual-class listings from the mid-
1920s to the mid-1980s,23 the American Stock Exchange 
(“AMEX”) and Nasdaq had more flexible policies.24 In 1976, 
the AMEX permitted Wang Laboratories to list with a dual-
class structure, subject to certain requirements that became 
AMEX policy for such listings.25 The “Wang formula,” as it 
was called, included the following requirements:  
• Limited voting shares must have the ability—
voting as a class—to elect not less than twenty-five 
percent of the board of directors. 
• The voting ratio may not be greater than 10:1 in 
favor of the high vote shares. 
• No additional stock may be created that would in 
any way diminish the voting rights of the limited 
voting shares. 
• The high vote shares should lose certain of its 
attributes if the number of such shares falls below 
a certain percentage of the total capitalization. 
 
22 Voting Rights, NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00 (2018); 
Voting Rights, Nasdaq Stock Market Equity Rules, § 5640, IM-5640, Voting 
Rights Policy (2018). 
23 Some exceptions were made––for Ford Motor Company, for example. 
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 
19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 569 (1991); Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in 
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 700 (1986). 
24 The AMEX rule stated: “The Exchange will not approve an 
application for the listing of a non-voting common stock issue. The Exchange 
may approve the listing of a common stock which has the right to elect only 
a minority of the board of directors.” Seligman, supra note 23, at 691. 
Regarding NASDAQ’s policies, see Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 575–76. 
25 Seligman, supra note 23, at 704. 
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• It was strongly recommended that the low vote 
class have a dividend preference.26  
At least twenty-two other companies followed the Wang 
formula with initial public offerings on the AMEX and seven 
more recapitalized into dual-class structures according to the 
Wang formula.27 Other companies started recapitalizing with 
dual-class structures as a takeover defense mechanism.28 
Competition among the exchanges ensued and the NYSE and 
Nasdaq ultimately adopted rules that also permitted dual-
class listings, with significantly fewer requirements than 
those included in the Wang formula.29 
Efforts to impose structure on dual-class adoptions at the 
NYSE and Nasdaq in the course of adapting to the AMEX 
approach ultimately came to no avail. In 1985, the NYSE 
subcommittee tasked with establishing rules for dual-class 
listings proposed a rule permitting listed companies to adopt 
a dual-class share structure as long as the voting differential 
per share was no more than 10:1 and the rights of the holders 
of the two classes of common stock were substantially the 
same except for voting power per share.30 In 1986, the 
directors of the NYSE ultimately proposed a rule that did not 
include the 10:1 voting ratio or similar rights restrictions.31 
 
26 Id. at 704 n.90 (citing Letter from Richard Scribner, Exec. Vice 
President for Legal and Regulatory Affairs of the AMEX to Joel Seligman 
(Aug. 15, 1985)). 
27 Id. at 704–05. 
28 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock 
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988); M. 
Megan Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock 
and Shareholder Wealth, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 313, 317, 322 (1987) (describing 
forty-three firms that adopted dual-class structures between 1962–84, of 
which thirty-three permitted public shareholders to elect a minority of the 
members of the board of directors). 
29 See supra, note 22. 
30 Seligman, supra note 23, at 692. 
31 Id. at 693. As of September 30, 1985, ten companies listed on the 
NYSE had dual-class share structures, despite the NYSE’s policy against 
non-voting shares and dual-class companies. These were Dow Jones, Ford 
Motor Co., Hershey Foods, General Motors, General Cinema, Fedders, 
Coastal, American Family, J.M. Smucker and Kaufman and Broad. Id. at 
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Also in 1985, Nasdaq proposed a rule, which was never 
adopted, that would have permitted dual-class share 
structures only if they were limited to ten years and had a 
voting rights ratio of 10:1.32  
While the NYSE and Nasdaq failed to pass rules imposing 
limitations on dual-class sunrise structures, and AMEX was 
ultimately required to liberalize its requirements to keep up 
with them (the AMEX ultimately merged with the NYSE in 
2008), the 10:1 ratio included in the Wang formula and 
considered by the NYSE and Nasdaq clearly became the 
prevailing norm among companies adopting dual-class 
structures.33 The Wang formula requirement that non-
controlling public shareholders be permitted to elect a 
minority of the directors was adopted much more sparingly.34 
B. Voting Rights 
A substantial majority of the firms in the data set have 
uncomplicated dual-class voting systems in which one class of 
common stock, held by founders and some or all pre-IPO 
investors, has a significantly greater number of votes on all 
matters than the class of common stock that is listed and sold 
to public investors. More than sixty percent of the companies 
in the data set had a 10:1 difference in voting rights (generally 
10x vs. 1x, although a small number of companies originally 
listed on the AMEX, still have a 1x vs. 1/10thx voting ratio). 
Eleven companies have a ratio lower than 10:1, while six 
companies have a ratio greater than 10:1.35 
 
703 n.81. The AMEX had approximately sixty companies with two classes 
of stock and the NASDAQ had at least 110. Id. at 703. 
32 Id. at 692. 
33 See infra Section III.B. 
34 See infra, Section III.C. 
35 Before the collapse of its dual-class structure into a single class 
structure in November 2016, Groupon had a 150:1 voting ratio. Universal 
Health Services has a 1000 to 1 voting ratio: the founder, Alan Miller, holds 
100% of the Class C shares that have 100 votes per share, while the publicly 
listed Class B shares have 1/10th of a vote per share. Andrew William 
Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). 
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Another straight-forward sunrise voting structure divides 
common stock between shares that have one vote per share 
and shares that have no votes per share. Despite the 
statements of journalists and pundits to the contrary,36 the 
Snap listing and sale of non-voting common stock to public 
investors was not the first initial public offering of non-voting 
shares. A number of other companies in a variety of industries 
have issued non-voting shares. A 1925 offering of non-voting 
shares by Dodge Brothers, Inc. led the NYSE to effectively ban 
the issuance of nonvoting stock for sixty years.37 Eight of the 
firms in the data set—in a diverse array of industries 
including education, insurance, investing, and liquors—
offered public investors nonvoting common stock in the 1970s, 
80s, and 90s.38 A few more firms, including Scripps Networks, 
The New York Times, and The Washington Post, offered 
investors shares with no votes except in the election of 
directors.  
About thirteen percent of the companies in the data set 
have more complicated voting structures. Some firms have 
three or four classes of common stock, each with different 
voting rights. Others companies, such as Comcast (one third) 
and Ford (forty percent), give the founder or founding family 
the right to control a significant minority of the voting rights 
in the company regardless of equity ownership. Still others 
limit the power of the high vote shares or the voting rights of 
the low vote shares to a limited number of voting matters, 
such as changes of control, executive compensation, and 
liquidation. 
While most dual-class companies list and offer to the public 
only their low or no vote classes of common stock, fifteen of the 
 
36 See Rob Kalb & Rob Yates, Snap, Inc. Reportedly to IPO with 
Unprecedented Non-Voting Shares for Public, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/2017/02/07/snap-inc-reportedly-to-ipo-with-unprecedented-non-voting-
shares-for-public/ [https://perma.cc/GJP3-DTC2].  
37 Seligman, supra note 23, at 694–99. 
38 Snap does appear to be the first technology company to offer public 
investors nonvoting shares in its IPO. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class 
Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
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companies in the data set have listed both their high vote and 
their low vote classes of common stock, including several that 
originally listed their shares on the AMEX.39 More recently, 
several companies have newly listed (or proposed to list) non-
voting common stock after previously listing low vote common 
shares.40 
C. Director Elections 
Another significant sunrise provision included in the 
charters of twenty of the dual-class companies in the data set 
is the right of public shareholders holding low vote shares to 
elect a minority of the directors of the company. These 
provisions generally give the low vote stockholders the right 
to elect a quarter to a third of the directors. Several of these 
companies were initially listed on the AMEX and presumably 
included the director election right pursuant to the Wang 
formula.41 Several companies controlled by either Barry Diller 
or the Nolan family also adopted this structure.42 Nike, which 
 
39 For companies listing both high and low vote shares, see infra 
Appendix C. 
40 Alphabet, Under Armour, and Zillow Holdings have each listed a new 
class of nonvoting common stock in addition to their existing classes of high 
and low voting common stock. Facebook and IAC/Interactive proposed to do 
so but withdrew their proposals following shareholder lawsuits seeking to 
block the issuances. See Blair Nicholas, Mark Lebovitch & Brandon Marsh, 
CalPERS Suit Marks Another Loss for Multiclass Stock Plans, LAW360 
(Oct. 10, 2017, 1:49PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/957467 
/calpers-suit-marks-another-loss-for-multiclass-stock-plans (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review); Deepa Seetharaman & Sarah E. 
Needleman, Facebook Abandons Plans to Change Share Structure, Avoiding 
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:43 P.M.), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-abandons-plans-to-change-share-
structure-avoiding-lawsuit-1506114877 (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review). 
41 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
42 Barry Diller controls IAC/Interactive, Expedia, TripAdvisor, and the 
Nolan family controls AMC Networks, Cablevision, and The Madison 
Square Garden Company. See Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data 
Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
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listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1980, used this 
structure, giving Phil Knight the right to elect seventy-five 
percent of the directors and public investors the right to elect 
twenty-five percent of the directors, while otherwise adopting 
a one share, one vote approach to shareholder voting. Molson 
Coors adopted a similar structure with equal voting other 
than for directors in 2005. 
Most of the companies including a minority right to elect 
directors in their charters have provisions in their by-laws 
allowing public shareholders to nominate directors for 
election at annual meetings of shareholders with advance 
notice to the company and the board. The by-laws also 
generally permit a majority of acting directors to nominate 
directors for election by the minority shareholders. The by-
laws do not typically provide for proxy access by the minority 
shareholders, however, so the ability of minority shareholders 
to get desired directors elected is dependent upon such 
shareholders having and using the financial resources 
necessary to conduct an independent proxy campaign for the 
directors they nominate pursuant to the advanced notice by-
laws or similar director nomination provisions.  
IV. SUNSET PROVISIONS 
Sunset provisions require some or all of the high vote 
shares to automatically convert to low vote shares upon the 
occurrence of certain events. The companies in the data set 
employed a wide variety of sunset provisions, including, most 
saliently: (1) no sunset at all, (2) the passage of a set number 
of years, typically measured by the anniversary of the listing 
(time-based or “listing anniversary” sunsets), (3) the dilution 
of high vote shares or controller ownership of such shares 
down to a low percentage of the aggregate number of 
outstanding common stock shares (dilution sunsets), (4) a 
diminution in the number of high vote shares or the number 
of high vote shares held by the controller as a percentage of 
the controller’s original ownership (divestment sunsets), (5) 
the death or incapacity of natural person holders (death or 
incapacity sunsets), (6) founder separation from employment 
with the company (separation sunsets), and (7) conversion 
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upon transfers of the high vote shares to persons or entities 
other than permitted transferees (transfer sunsets). Tables 
detailing the incidence of various sunset provisions among the 
companies in the dual-class data set are included in Appendix 
B. 
A. No Sunset: Eternal Asymmetric Control 
Among the companies in the data set, sixty-four percent of 
the companies that went public prior to 2000 and thirty-six 
percent of the companies that went public after 2000 did not 
have any sunset provisions in their charters at all. Several 
more companies have either dilution or divestment sunsets 
that are so de minimis as to be meaningless, or included 
transfer sunsets excluding transfers to family members. So, a 
total of 74 of the 139 companies in the data set, or fifty-three 
percent, do not have any effective sunset provisions in their 
charters. As the tables in Appendix B show, however, there is 
a clear trend toward more companies including more sunset 
provisions in their charters over time.43 
B. Time-Based Sunsets 
Time-based sunsets require automatic conversion of the 
high vote stock into low vote stock upon the passage of a 
certain number of years following the initial public offering of 
the low vote stock. This is presumably what most institutional 
investors and proxy advisors are referring to when they insist 
that dual-class companies must adopt reasonable sunset 
provisions. Only 25 of the 139 companies included in this dual-
class data set adopted such a time-based sunset provision.44 
The period of time before automatic conversion varies from 
five to twenty-eight years. Until 2017, seven years had been 
the most frequently chosen period. As a result of several 
offerings in 2017 including ten-year time-based sunsets, the 
 
43 While eighty percent of the companies going public before 2000 had 
no effective sunset, only forty percent of the companies going public after 
2000 had no effective sunset. 
44 Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
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most frequent period is now ten years. In two cases, the 
anniversary sunset is dependent upon the extent to which 
high vote shares have been diluted or divested.45 Among the 
companies with time-based sunsets in the dual-class data set, 
four (Rockwell Automation, Texas Roadhouse, Groupon, and 
MaxLinear) have experienced an automatic conversion of 
their high vote shares into low vote shares and reclassification 
into a single class of common stock.46  
There has been a significant increase in the number of 
companies adopting time-based sunsets in the last few years, 
with thirty-five percent of the companies listing from 2010–
 
45 The Ironwood Pharmaceuticals certificate provides that if the high 
vote shares constitute less than twenty percent of the authorized and 
twenty-five percent of the aggregate number of shares of common stock 
outstanding, the high vote shares will automatically convert on the eighth 
anniversary of the 2010 listing date. Otherwise, they will convert on the 
twenty-eighth anniversary. Ironwood Pharm., Inc., Annual Report (Form 
10-K) (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1446847/ 
000104746911002858/a2202841z10-k.htm [https://perma.cc/8HK9-FCPM]. 
RingCentral provides that as long as a high vote shareholder and, other 
than in the case of a founder, its permitted transferees hold at least fifty 
percent of the high vote shares held by such holder at the time of the initial 
public offering, the high vote shares held by such stockholder will not 
automatically convert pursuant to the otherwise applicable sunset on the 
seventh-year anniversary of the initial public offering. RingCentral, Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1384905/000119312515 
212122/d935472d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/TS9C-4FEN]. 
46 The Rockwell Automation high vote shares converted on February 
23, 1997. Rockwell Int’l Corp., Annual Report (Form 11-K) (June 30, 1997), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024478/0001024478-97-
000009.txt [https://perma.cc/R9N3-7PLC]. The Texas Roadhouse high vote 
shares converted on September 30, 2009. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1289460/000110465909057645/a09-29694_18k.htm [https://perma.cc/QZ76-
AKVD]. Groupon’s high vote shares converted into low vote shares on 
October 31, 2016. Groupon, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000119312516753614/d2
74158d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/8MXH-4HBQ]. MaxLinear’s high vote 
shares converted into low vote shares on March 29, 2017. MaxLinear, Inc., 
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2017 adopting such sunsets, as compared to only three percent 
of the companies in the data set that listed prior to 2010. In 
2017, forty-one percent of the companies adopting dual-class 
structures included time-based sunsets. While the vast 
majority of companies with time-based sunsets in the data set 
are technology companies listed over the last seven years, and 
the number of companies adopting time-based sunsets has 
increased significantly compared to prior periods, these 
sunsets are neither a recent phenomenon nor limited to the 
tech sector. Among time-based sunset adopters found in the 
data set are a real estate company, a restaurant chain, and 
manufacturers, in addition to software companies. For 
example, Helene Curtis, a cosmetics company, adopted a 
reviewable five-year time-based sunset in the dual-class 
structure it adopted in the 1980s.47  
C. Dilution Sunsets 
A dilution sunset triggers a conversion of the high vote 
shares to low vote shares when the number of high vote shares 
declines below a set percentage of the aggregate number of 
high vote and low vote shares outstanding. This dilution of the 
high vote shares can occur as a result of a decline in the 
number of high vote shares through conversion into low vote 
shares (typically for sale in the public market) or an increase 
in the number of low vote shares as the latter are used to 
compensate employees, acquire other companies, or obtain 
additional capital for investment in the enterprise.48  
Forty-eight of the companies in the data set, eight of which 
went public prior to 2000, included a dilution sunset provision 
in their charters. Among the forty-eight companies with a 
dilution sunset provision, fifty-four percent of them made 
dilution below ten percent the trigger for automatic 
 
47 Gordon, supra note 28, at 80. 
48 Typically, high vote shares and low vote shares are separate series 
of common stock and the denominator for purposes of a high vote dilution 
sunset provision is the “aggregate common stock outstanding.” 
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conversion.49 One of the companies included in the data set, 
Yelp, Inc., collapsed its dual-class structure into a single class 
of common stock as a result of triggering its ten percent 
aggregate share number dilution provision in 2016.50 
A number of companies in the data set include dilution 
conversion triggers based on the percentage of high and/or low 
vote shares owned by a founder or controller (as opposed to 
the absolute number of high vote shares outstanding). These 
provisions come in a variety of versions. The most frequent 
version, employed by eight companies, triggers a conversion if 
the number of high vote shares (or high and low vote shares, 
in aggregate) owned by the founder/controller is lower than a 
specified percentage, varying by company between five 
percent and twenty-five percent, of the aggregate number of 
shares of common stock.51 Two companies established double-
triggers, requiring the founder/controller’s ownership of both 
high and low vote stock to fall below a specified percentage of 
the total number of such shares of stock.  
D. Divestment Sunsets 
A close cousin of the dilution sunset is the divestment 
sunset, which focuses on the number of high vote shares 
issued and outstanding. There are two types of divestment 
sunsets: (1) a sunset triggered when the number of high vote 
 
49 In other words, conversion occurs automatically when the high vote 
shares constitute fewer than ten percent of the aggregate number of shares 
of common stock outstanding (where both high vote and low vote shares are 
separate series of common stock). 
50 Yelp Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1345016/000120677416007234/ye
lp3063374-8k.htm [http://perma.cc/C33P-RFVB]; see also Alfred Lee, Yelp 
Shows Way in Supervoting Stock Sunset, THE INFO. (Sept. 26, 2016, 7:01 
AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/yelp-shows-way-in-
supervoting-stock-sunset [http://perma.cc/Y8JT-8VGP]. 
51 The eight companies are: Altair Engineering, Inc., Caravana Co., 
Houlihan Lokey, Inc., Moelis & Company, SecureWorks Corp., Texas 
Roadhouse, Inc., Tilly’s, Inc., and Virtu Financial, Inc. See Andrew William 
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shares outstanding declines below a set number of shares, and 
(2) a sunset triggered when the founder/controller sells more 
than a stated percentage of the shares initially held by the 
founder/controller. Divestment sunsets focus more directly on 
the actions of the controlling high vote shareholders than 
dilution sunsets as they are not influenced by the issuance of 
additional low vote shares. Thus, while a founder/controller 
may still worry about voting dilution through the issuance of 
low vote shares over time, she need not worry about collapse 
of the dual-class structure as long as she doesn’t sell down the 
requisite number of her high vote shares. 
The divestment sunset is the fourth most frequently 
observed sunset provision, utilized by nineteen of the 
companies in the data set, including eight companies 
incorporated before 2000.52 The number of high vote shares 
triggering a conversion varies as a percentage of the 
authorized and outstanding shares of high vote stock, 
depending on the company. Apart from Federated Investors, 
Inc., which provides for non-voting common stock to convert 
into voting common stock only if there are no voting shares 
outstanding,53 the lowest (that is, most difficult to pull) 
trigger as a percentage of the number of high vote shares 
outstanding at the time of the filing of the certificate is less 
than one percent for Forest City Enterprises, Inc.54 The 
highest trigger is a number equal to 47.5% of the high vote 
shares outstanding, for Ford Motor Company.55 Six 
 
52 See infra Appendix B. 
53 Federated Inv’rs, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) (Mar. 20, 
1998), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056288/ 
0000950132-98-000240.txt [http://perma.cc/Y29R-VKU6]. 
54 Forest City Enters., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 9, 
2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/38067/ 
000095015208010076/l34747aexv3w1.htm [http://perma.cc/W6RZ-W6SS]. 
55 Ford Motor Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 22, 2001), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/0000037 
99601000014/0000037996-01-000014-0002.txt [http://perma.cc/EGD8-
Q7D7]. According to Ford’s balance sheet, Ford had seventy-one million 
shares of Class B common stock issued and outstanding at the time the 
August 2000 certificate of incorporation went into effect. Ford Motor Co., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2000), 
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companies focus on the number of high vote shares as a 
percentage of the number of such shares owned by the 
founder/controller at the time of the initial public offering, 
with percentages varying between zero percent and fifty 
percent.56  
E. Death and Incapacity Sunsets 
Another form of sunset provides for the automatic 
conversion of the high vote shares held by a natural person 
into low vote shares upon the death or incapacity of the 
shareholder. In some cases, death and incapacity conversion 
provisions cause the entire dual-class structure to terminate 
upon the death of the founder of the company. In most cases, 
death and incapacity conversion provisions provide for 
conversion of only the shares held by the affected holder (or 
founder). Even the latter provisions can lead to termination of 
the structure over time as the limited number of holders of 
dual-class shares die or become incapacitated. Some death 
and incapacity conversion provisions contain loopholes, which 
effectively eviscerate their sunset potential.  
Death and incapacity sunset provisions were not a 
frequent feature of dual-class stock structures until the 
twenty-first century. Only two out of forty-two, or five percent, 
of the dual-class data set companies listed in the twentieth 
century automatically converted the high vote stock upon the 
death of the holder. The numbers have risen dramatically in 
the twenty-first century, however, with twenty-two percent of 
the data set companies listed in the first decade and fifty-
seven percent of the companies listing in the second decade 




56 These six companies are: Bandwidth, Inc. (40%), Fairway Group 
Holdings Corp. (0%), Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (25%), Nutanix, Inc. 
(20%), RingCentral, Inc. (50%), and Snap, Inc. (30%). Andrew William 
Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). 
57 Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
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and incapacity provisions in the last ten years reflects the 
significant increase in the number of technology companies 
adopting dual-class structures. Most of the companies that 
include such provisions are technology companies; many of 
the dual-class companies that do not include them are not.58  
As can be seen in the table in Appendix B, like dilution and 
divestment sunsets, a variety of approaches to death and 
incapacity sunsets have emerged. Some provisions focus on 
holders generally, while others focus only on founders. A 
majority of the companies including death and incapacity 
provisions in their IPO charters after 2009 included both 
holders and founders, with conversion of the shares held by a 
natural person occurring immediately upon the death of a 
holder other than a founder, and nine months after the death 
of a founder (sometimes referred to as a “Key Holder”).59 Eight 
companies in the data set, including four companies listed in 
2017, included a separate sunset providing for collapse of the 
entire dual-class structure upon the death of the founder.60 
 
58 Id. 
59 Some companies have slight variations on this provision. Alphabet, 
for example, states that the high vote shares held by a founder will 
automatically convert to low vote shares upon the death of the founder 
unless previously transferred to another founder, in which case they will 
convert nine months after the death of the transferring founder. Alphabet 
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000119312515336577/d8
2837dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/75YQ-P3Y9]. The Workday charter states 
that the high vote shares convert nine months after the death of the last 
founder to die. Workday, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 7, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327811/000119312512495545/d4
11267dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/9425-872E]. 
60 These are: Altair Engineering, Inc. (IPO 2017), Blue Apron Holdings, 
Inc. (IPO 2017), CarGurus, Inc. (IPO 2017), Hamilton Lane, Inc. (IPO 2017), 
Moelis & Company (IPO 2014), NCI, Inc. (IPO 2005), Re/Max Holdings, Inc. 
(IPO 2013), and Tilly’s Inc. (IPO 2012). Facebook proposed to include a 
charter provision collapsing its dual-class stock structure three years after 
the death of Mark Zuckerberg in connection with introducing non-voting 
Class C shares. Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (June 2, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/0001 
32680116000074/facebook2016definitiveprox.htm [https://perma.cc/D5R8-
A9TF]. Since its listing, Facebook has had no death or incapacity sunset 
provision. Following a shareholder lawsuit challenging the issuance of the 
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Several of the companies include both incapacity and death 
as a trigger for the conversion of the high vote shares held by 
the affected person.61 While some of the charters refer to 
“disability” rather than “incapacity,” disability is typically 
defined for purposes of the provision by reference to legal 
incapacity, so incapacity is used here to avoid confusion or 
misperception.  
Death and incapacity conversion provisions can only be 
effective as a sunset provision, however, if they cover not only 
the directly held shares of the relevant individual, but also 
shares the decedent previously transferred to permitted 
transferees (such as trusts, retirement accounts, and other 
legal entities for estate planning purposes or otherwise). 
Among companies that went public after 2009, a majority of 
the holder death and incapacity provisions, and most of the 
founder death and incapacity provisions, applied the 
automatic conversion to shares held by permitted transferees 
and to shares held directly by the individual.62 
A number of other variations on the death and incapacity 
conversion provision can defeat the sunset effect of the 
provision. The charters of some companies state that the high 
vote shares convert upon death, unless the shares are 
transferred prior to death, and in some cases only if 
transferred to another high vote shareholder.63 The charter of 
 
Class C shares, Facebook rescinded the proposal to amend its charter. 
Seetharaman & Needleman, supra, note 40. 
61 See infra Appendix C. 
62 In the case of Zynga, the natural person death and incapacity 
provision includes shares held by permitted transferees, but the founder 
death and incapacity provision applying to Mark Pincus does not—shares 
held by his permitted transferees will not automatically convert upon his 
death or incapacity. Zynga, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 13, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1439404/000119312514236407/d7
42303dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/RJ8V-MEUJ]. 
63 AppFolio, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433195/000143319515000003/ex
hibit3163015.htm [http://perma.cc/T68H-WHBV] (allowing conversion upon 
death nine months after death unless transferred); Castlight Health, Inc., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (May 12, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433714/000143371414000012/ex
hibit31restatedcertifica.htm [http://perma.cc/AHY3-95T6] (granting 
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one company applies the death conversion provision only to 
high vote shares acquired post-IPO, meaning it doesn’t apply 
to the founder and fund holders who control the company.64 
F. Separation Sunsets 
Three of the firms in the survey have included provisions 
in their charters for conversion of high vote stock if the 
founder of the company is no longer managing the company. 
These provisions are separation sunsets.  
Among the companies in the data set, Moelis & Co. broke 
new ground when, in connection with its 2014 IPO, it included 
a provision in its charter stating that its high vote shares 
would be entitled to ten votes per share only if founder, CEO, 
and controlling stockholder Kenneth Moelis “has not had his 
employment agreement terminated in accordance with its 
terms because of a breach of his covenant to devote his 
primary business time and effort to the business and affairs 
of the Corporation and its subsidiaries or because he suffered 
an Incapacity[.]”65  
The Moelis & Co. high vote shares would also lose their 
additional votes if Kenneth Moelis were ever “convicted of a 
 
automatic conversion unless previously transferred); Ironwood Pharm,, 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 30, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1446847/000104746910002966/a2
197484zex-3_1.htm [http://perma.cc/F8ES-4VT4] (granting automatic 
conversion unless previously transferred); RingCentral, Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1384905/000119312515212122/d9
35472dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/HCJ7-H6RH ] (excepting conversion upon 
death if transferred to another high vote shareholder); Workiva, Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1445305/000144530514005577/w
orkiva8-kexhibit31.htm [http://perma.cc/9UAA-L2DH ] (granting automatic 
conversion unless previously transferred). 
64 Inovalon, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A) (Feb. 6, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1619954/00010474691500 
0652/a2222935zex-3_1.htm [http://perma.cc/7AXD-FD4K]. 
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criminal violation of a material U.S. federal or state securities 
law that constitutes a felony or a felony involving moral 
turpitude . . . .”66 This is the only dual-class sunset provision 
in the data set that provides for a sunset of the dual-class 
structure upon a felony conviction of the 
founder/CEO/controlling stockholder. In the case of Moelis, 
this sunset is an appropriate complement to the founder 
employment termination provision because the laws and 
regulations applying to the executives of financial institutions 
taking custody of client funds make it difficult for persons who 
have been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude to 
serve as executives of such institutions.67  
CarGurus, Inc. and Hamilton Lane, Inc., both of which 
listed in 2017, included provisions in their charters collapsing 
the dual-class structure when the founder(s) voluntarily 
terminate all employment and director positions with the 
company—in other words, when they are no longer directly 
involved in the management of the company.68  
In connection with introducing non-voting Class C common 
stock in 2016, Facebook proposed amendments to the dual-
class sunset provisions in its charter that would convert its 
high vote Class B common stock into low vote Class A common 
stock upon the termination for cause or resignation of Mark 
 
66 Id. 
67 Convicted felons are often prohibited from working in certain 
industries under either federal or state law. Commonly prohibited 
industries include banking, insurance, health care, and real estate. In the 
financial sector, prohibitions typically extend to persons convicted of crimes 
involving dishonesty and breaches of trust. For banks and affiliates of 
insured banks, see Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(1), 
(g)(1)(C), 1829(a) (2012). For credit unions, see Federal Credit Union Act, § 
205(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (d)(1) (2012). For investment advisors, see 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e), (f) (2012). For 
broker-dealers, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78o(b)(4)(B), (b)(6)(A) (2012). 
68 Cargurus, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494259/0001104659170623 
78/a17-24010_1ex3d1.htm [https://perma.cc/7YUF-XZDL]; Hamilton Lane, 
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Zuckerberg—its founder, CEO, and controlling stockholder—
as CEO, board chairman or another “Approved Executive 
Officer” position.69 Following a shareholder lawsuit 
challenging the charter amendments, Facebook withdrew the 
proposal on the eve of evidentiary hearings in 2017, so the 
death and separation sunsets included in the proposal have 
not been incorporated into Facebook’s charter.70 
G. Transfer Sunsets 
In the twentieth century, free transferability of high vote 
shares in dual-class companies was the norm.71 Thirty of the 
forty-four companies in the data set that listed their shares in 
the twentieth century permit free transferability of their high 
vote stock. Another ten companies permitted transfers only to 
members of the founding family. Two companies included an 
outright prohibition on transfers of high vote stock, making 
any purported transfer a cause for automatic conversion into 
low vote stock.72  
The listing of Google, Inc. in 2004 appears to have caused 
a sea change in the free transferability of high vote shares. 
Google included significant restrictions on the transfer of high 
vote shares, including a prohibition barring its founders from 
 
69 For purposes of the “termination for cause” provision, cause was 
defined as a variety of deliberate or willful acts of misfeasance that are 
“materially and demonstrably injurious to the corporation,” though not 
conviction of a felony. No such act was to be considered deliberate or willful 
“unless it is done by the Founder in bad faith and without reasonable belief 
that the Founder’s action or inaction was in the best interests of the 
corporation.”  Furthermore, the founder/CEO/controlling stockholder could 
not be terminated for cause without sixty days’ notice and an opportunity to 
be heard by the independent directors of the board. Facebook, Inc., Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A) (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116000074/fa
cebook2016definitiveprox.htm [https://perma.cc/X87H-BB46]. 
70 Seetharaman & Needleman, supra note 40. 
71 For a list of the companies in the survey by date of listing, see infra 
Appendix A. 
72 See, e.g., Universal Health Serv., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 
(Aug. 12, 1997), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/352915/ 
0000893220-97-001362.txt [https://perma.cc/4FVW-DAU7]. 
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transferring their shares to family members. Only fourteen of 
the eighty-four companies in the data set that listed after 
Google permitted free transferability of their high vote shares. 
That is a remarkable change from the thirty of fifty companies 
in the survey listing prior to Google that permitted free 
transferability of their shares. The shift is even more 
pronounced when one considers the fact that most of the 
fourteen firms permitting free transferability after Google 
either publicly list the high vote stock73 or were spun out of or 
formed from dual-class companies that permit free 
transferability themselves.74 
Because charter provisions providing for the conversion of 
high vote shares into low vote shares upon transfer can lead 
to a change in control of a dual-class company, if not the 
collapse of the dual-class structure in its entirety, they are 
appropriately considered sunset provisions and can be 
referred to as transfer sunsets. As most U.S. dual-class public 
companies have listed only their low vote stock, holders of 
high vote stock are typically permitted to voluntarily convert 
their high vote stock to low vote stock at any time to obtain 
liquidity. They may, however, prefer to transfer their high 
vote stock directly. If, over time, all of the high vote stock is 
transferred and converted upon transfer, the company will 
gradually convert to a single class capital structure. Even in 
the more likely scenario that some, but not all, of the high vote 
stock is transferred and converted, as high vote stockholders 
seek liquidity in the public markets, founders or controlling 
stockholders can lose control of a company over time—
 
73 For example, Discovery Communications, Inc. (listed in 2008) did 
this. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
74 The following list includes such companies. The information in 
parenthesis that follows notes the year and company from which the 
company was spun out or formed from. AMC Networks, Inc. (2011–
Cablevision), Expedia, Inc. (2005–IAC/InterActiveCorp), Molson Coors 
(2005–Coors), News Corporation (2013–Twenty-First Century Fox), Scripps 
Networks Interactive, Inc. (2008–E.W. Scripps Company), TripAdvisor, Inc. 
(2011–Expedia), Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., the successor to News 
Corporation (2004 as Delaware re-incorporation of The News Corporation 
Limited of Australia), and Viacom, Inc. (2005–CBS Corporation). Id. 
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particularly if the company also has a dilution sunset 
provision.75 Hence, charter provisions that call for conversion 
of high vote shares upon transfer can lead to an end, or sunset, 
of the control of the company by a particular stockholder. 
Charters with strict transfer restraints and provisions for 
automatic conversion upon the death of natural person 
holders of high vote stock and their permitted transferees—
discussed supra Section III.E.—effectively limit control to the 
lifetime of the founder. 
Charter provisions that provide for conversion upon 
transfer of high vote shares typically include a number of 
exceptions. The exceptions have been narrowing over time, 
making many of the more recent transfer conversion 
provisions more effective as a sunset than earlier ones. 
Exceptions that effectively defeat the sunset-forcing 
potential of the transfer conversion provisions include 
exceptions for transfers to family members, transfers from one 
founder to another, transfers to specific stockholders, 
transfers to other current high vote stockholders, transfers to 
controlled entities, and transfers from stockholders that are 
corporations, LLCs, or partnerships to their shareholders, 
members, or partners, respectively.  
Transfer conversion provisions exempting transfers to 
controlling family members, trusts, and other vehicles for the 
benefit of the original stockholder and such holder’s family 
members do not act as an effective sunset mechanism. Family 
exemptions promote the aggregation and extension of control 
to the controller and the controller’s descendants, 
discouraging family members from breaking ranks and selling 
control shares to outsiders, for example. As noted above, to the 
extent transfer conversion provisions were included at all by 
dual-class companies listing in the twentieth century, they 
typically exempted transfers to family members and related 
vehicles, retaining control of the company in the family 
indefinitely. Tyson Foods, Inc., which listed in 1978, and the 
Ralph Lauren Corporation, which listed in 1997, are among 
 
75 This is what happened in the case of Yelp, Inc. See Lee, supra note 
50. 
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those twentieth century companies that included transfer 
conversion sunsets with exceptions for family transfers.76 
Three of the companies that went public since 2000 permit 
transfers only to family members,77 while a slightly larger 
number of post-2000 companies include transfer sunsets with 
exceptions for transfers to founders’ and other high vote 
stockholders’ family members.78 
Transfer conversion provisions which exempt founder-to-
founder transfers similarly retain control in the founding 
group, even if one founder decides to divest and diversify. Six 
of the companies in the survey, including Alphabet, Inc. (as 
successor to Google, Inc.) include such founder-to-founder 
exceptions to their transfer conversion provisions, sometimes 
referring to the founders as “Key Holders.”79 
In a similar vein, some transfer conversion provisions 
exempt transfers to specific stockholders, typically controlling 
corporate stockholders.80 A broader version of this provision 
permits transfer as long as transfer is made to another 
existing high vote stockholder. Three of the companies in the 
survey included such a provision, one limiting it to high vote 
stockholders owning at least one percent of the aggregate 
number of shares of high vote stock.81 
 
76 Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
77 These are: Coty, Inc., Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., and Virtu 
Financial, Inc. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review). 
78 These include: Castlight Health, Inc., Duluth Holdings, Facebook, 
Inc., Fitbit, Inc., Globus Medical, Inc., GoPro, Inc., Ironwood 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Phibro Animal Health Corp., Pure Storage, Inc., 
Tableau Software, Inc., Twilio, Inc., and zulily, Inc. Id. 
79 The six companies are: Alphabet, Inc., Apptio, Inc., Box, Inc., 
Workday, Inc., Zillow Group, Inc., and zulily, Inc. Id. 
80 The following lists examples of companies that have such provisions, 
along with the company’s controlling corporate stockholder in parenthesis: 
Coty, Inc. (Berkshire), Fairway Group Holdings Corp. (Sterling Advisors), 
First Data Corp. (KKR), Houlihan Lokey, Inc. (Orix), and SecureWorks 
Corp. (Denali Entities [Dell]). Id. 
81 Fairway Group, Groupon, and Inovalon exempt transfers to other 
Class B Stockholders. Appfolio, Inc. exempts transfers to registered holders 
of at least one percent of the total number of high votes shares. Id. 
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Some of the companies have clauses that exempt transfers 
to entities controlled by the high vote stockholder, which 
permits high vote stockholders to effectively share the voting 
rights with one or more third parties who also have interests 
in the entity. Several companies include a broader provision 
that permits transfers to affiliates or entities that are 
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the 
high vote stockholder. A narrower version of this provision 
that makes it more challenging to transfer the voting power 
requires that the high vote stockholder exclusively control the 
entity. Five of the companies in the survey included references 
to exclusive ownership. A further refined version of the 
provision, which seems to be the most prevalent version 
among more recently listed dual-class companies, requires the 
high vote stockholder to retain dispositive and voting power 
over the shares that are transferred to a different legal entity 
(whether the economic rights in the entity are owned and 
controlled by the high vote stockholder or not). This latter 
provision makes it more difficult to pass along the high vote 
shares through an estate, as the argument could be made that 
the entity is no longer a permitted transferee after the high 
vote stockholder dies and is no longer able to exercise voting 
or dispositive power. This presumption that shares 
transferred with retention of voting and dispositive power by 
the transferor convert upon the death of the transferor can be 
and sometimes is made explicit in the death and incapacity 
sunset provisions in the charter, as discussed supra, Section 
III. E.  
The requirement for retention of voting and dispositive 
power was introduced by Google at the time of its listing in 
2004. The Google provision established a fairly strict approach 
to conversion upon transfer, with few exceptions, which were 
designed to limit, as much as possible, possession of control to 
the founders and high vote stockholders holding shares at the 
time of the initial public offering.82 The Google provision does 
not permit transfers to family members, or to affiliates, and 
 
82 Google, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form S-
1/A) (Aug. 9, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1288776/000119312504135503/ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/7K8Q-TBQS]. 
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prohibits transfers to trusts, individual retirement accounts 
(“IRAs”), and other legal entities such as partnerships and 
corporations absent ongoing exclusive control over the voting 
and disposition of the high vote shares by the original high 
vote stockholder/founder.83 The Google provision also states 
that the high vote shares transferred to a trust without 
conversion may not involve the payment of cash, securities, 
property, or other consideration to the transferor.84 The 
Google provision does, however, provide an exemption for 
transfers of high vote shares by partnerships and limited 
liability companies, the kinds of entities typically used by 
venture capital investors, to their partners or members, 
respectively, pro rata, if the partnership or LLC held five 
percent or more of the high vote shares at the time of the 
initial public offering.85  
The Facebook listing in 2012 took transfer conversion 
sunset provisions in a more liberal direction again, 
reintroducing provisions for dynastic control, including 
permitting transfers to family members without conversion, 
and permitting transfers to charitable organizations.86 The 
provision also stated that permitted transferees do not lose 
their status as permitted transferees by virtue of the death of 
the transferor, which perpetuates control beyond the death of 
the founder or other high vote stockholders, in direct contrast 





86 Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2012), exhibit 
3.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/00011931251232 
5997/d371464dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/V4NR-HQYR]. 
87 This provision is no longer effective under the amendments proposed 
to Facebook’s charter in connection with its creation of no vote Class C 
common stock since all Facebook high vote Class B stock would convert to 
low vote Class A stock upon the third anniversary of the death or incapacity 
of Mr. Zuckerberg. Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (June 
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includes a significant loophole permitting third parties to 
obtain control over high vote stock by making it easier to 
transfer high vote stock to trusts for the benefit of the holder, 
family members, or others, by dropping the requirement that 
the transferor must retain voting and dispositive control over 
the high vote shares held in the trust.  
On the other hand, the Facebook approach, which utilizes 
a defined term, “Permitted Entity”, is more restrictive than 
the Google approach with respect to transfers to other legal 
entities. The Facebook approach limits the ability of third 
parties to benefit from full or partial ownership of an entity 
receiving a transfer of high vote shares by providing that 
transfers can only be made to corporations, partnerships, and 
other entities owned exclusively by the transferor, rather than 
taking the Google approach of insisting that the transferor 
retain exclusive voting and dispositive control of the high vote 
shares transferred to such an entity (the economic interests in 
which might be owned entirely by third parties).  
V. LAW FIRMS AND CHOICES OF SUNSET 
PROVISIONS 
Prior studies have shown that law firms matter—that is, 
different law firms choose different terms in preparing the 
charter documents for clients pursuing an initial public 
offering.88 Investment bankers also play an advisory role in 
the choice of charter provisions, such as dual-class sunrise and 
sunset provisions, that can affect the pricing of an initial 
 
88 John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: 
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2001) (finding that Silicon 
Valley firms were less likely than their New York counterparts to include 
antitakeover provisions in IPO charters in 1991–92, but were just as likely 
to include such terms by 1998–99); Robert Daines, The Incorporation 
Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1595 (2002) (finding that 
companies undergoing an IPO are more likely to be incorporated in 
Delaware than in their home state when advised by national as opposed to 
local counsel); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering 
Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 31, 31 
(2017) (finding that the adoption of exclusive forum selection provisions in 
charters and by-laws from 2007–14 was driven by law firms). 
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public offering. This dual-class data set similarly suggests 
that lawyers and bankers play an important role in the choice 
of charter provisions adopted in an IPO. In dual-class share 
structures, these parties are particularly relevant to the 
nature of the sunset provisions chosen. 
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (“WSGR”) served as 
issuer’s counsel to Google in connection with its IPO, and has 
also represented several other companies that have adopted 
dual-class share structures.89 The Google dual-class structure 
broke new ground with fairly strict transfer sunsets and death 
and incapacity sunsets for the shares held by its founders, 
interrupting the inter-generational transfer of control. Most 
of WSGR’s clients have adopted fairly consistent sunrise and 
sunset provisions in line with the Google precedent. The 
transfer sunset and death and incapacity sunset provisions 
were made more restrictive by LinkedIn in 2011, which added 
the term “for tax or estate planning purposes” to limit the 
instances in which a high vote stockholder could transfer high 
vote shares to trusts, IRAs and other entities, and included 
shares held by permitted transferees of high vote holders in 
the death and incapacity conversion trigger.90 Most of the 
companies that adopted the Google model after 2011 included 
these phrases.91 Later adopters also typically dropped the 
exemptions for transfers by venture funds structured as 
partnerships or LLCs.92 
 
89 These include Apptio, Box, Dolby Laboratories, LinkedIn, 
MaxLinear, Mindbody, MuleSoft, Nutanix, RingCentral and Square. 
Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on File with the Columbia 
Business Law Review).  
90 LinkedIn Corp., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, 
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Mar. 11, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1271024/000119312511064249/de
x32.htm [https://perma.cc/Q2EM-NNL2]. 
91 This includes Apptio, Box, MINDBODY, RingCentral and Square, 
but not MaxLinear and Nutanix, which permit transfers to family members, 
and Dolby Laboratories, which has no sunsets at all. Andrew William 
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A number of the companies that have gone public after 
Facebook have included provisions mimicking the Facebook 
provision. Facebook and a number of the companies adopting 
its approach (or their investment bankers) were represented 
by Fenwick & West in connection with their initial public 
offerings.93 Some of the companies that followed the Facebook 
approach made their transfer conversion provisions more 
strict by importing the Google requirement that the transferor 
retain sole dispositive power and exclusive voting control in 
their definitions of “Permitted Entity” and “Permitted 
Trust.”94 The Cooley law firm (“Cooley”) appeared to begin 
with the WSGR approach95 but moved to the Fenwick 
approach96 over time.  
Cooley, Fenwick & West, and WSGR are all based in 
Silicon Valley. The incidence of time-based sunsets, death and 
incapacity sunsets, and transfer sunsets prohibiting transfers 
to family members declines significantly among both 
technology and non-technology companies represented by law 
firms that are not based in Silicon Valley. Some of those firms 
are regional, and some of their clients are incorporated in 
jurisdictions outside Delaware, but many of the firms 
adopting more founder and dynasty-friendly dual-class 
charters are national firms.97 
 
93 Castlight, Fitbit, GoPro, and Workday were all represented by 
Fenwick & West. With the exception of Workday, which listed only a few 
months after Facebook, these companies follow Facebook’s original charter, 
permitting transfers to family members and declining to include a death 
and incapacity sunset. Id. 
94 These companies include Pure Storage, Tableau, and zulily, which 
were all clients of Cooley, however, and not Fenwick & West. Appfolio also 
incorporated this limitation into its definition of “Trust”. Id. 
95 Examples include Yelp and zulily. Id. 
96 Examples include Pure Storage and Tableau Software. Id. 
97 Consider, for example, Globus Medical (Drinker, Biddle), Inovalon 
(Morrison & Foerster), Ironwood Pharmaceuticals (Ropes & Gray), Phibro 
Animal (Kirkland & Ellis), Reata Pharmaceuticals (Vinson & Elkins), RMR 
Group (Skadden), Scripps Networks Interactive (Baker & Hostetler), Swift 
Transportation (Skadden; Scudder Law Firm), Tilly’s (Latham & Watkins), 
Trade Desk (Latham & Watkins), and Workiva (Drinker, Biddle). Other 
firms have chosen to follow the WSGR model include: Groupon (Winston & 
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It is clear that issuer’s counsel has more impact on some 
matters than they do on others. There is greater variance 
among the clients of each of WSGR, Fenwick & West, and 
Cooley with respect to matters such as the use of time-based, 
dilution, and divestment sunsets. Accordingly, it appears that 
such matters receive significantly greater input from clients—
either founders or their boards of directors, which typically 
includes venture capital investors—than death and incapacity 
sunsets and transfer sunsets, which tend to follow the model 
utilized by the firm more consistently.98  
Bankers also provide guidance to founders as they consider 
dual-class stock structures, based on bankers’ experience from 
prior deals regarding the effects of different provisions on the 
pricing of deals. It appears that one of the most important 
common denominators among the early adopters of time-
based sunset provisions in recent years were Morgan Stanley 
(as a leading underwriter) and Davis, Polk & Wardwell (as 
counsel to the underwriters). Of the first six initial public 
offerings that included a time-based sunset provision after 
such provisions began to be adopted with regularity in 2010, 
Morgan Stanley was involved in five and Davis Polk & 
Wardwell was involved in four.99 
 
Strawn), Kayak (Bingham McCutchen), Twilio (Goodwin), Veeva Systems 
(Gunderson), Wayfair (Latham & Watkins), and Zillow (Perkins Coie). Id. 
98 Five of WSGR’s ten clients in the data set included time-based 
sunsets, whereas two of five Fenwick clients did so, and two of five Cooley 
clients did so. Id. 
99 Morgan Stanley was “lead left”, or the leading bank, in offerings by: 
MaxLinear (2010), Groupon (2011), Kayak Software (2012), and Workday 
(2012). Morgan Stanley was a joint book-running manager with an equal 
allocation to the lead left, J.P. Morgan, in the initial public offering of 
Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, the first company in recent years to go public 
with a time-based sunset provision, in February of 2010. Morgan Stanley 
was not involved in the initial public offering of Yelp (2012). Davis Polk & 
Wardwell represented the underwriters in the IPOs of Ironwood 
Pharmaceuticals, MaxLinear, Kayak Software, and Yelp. Id. 
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VI. EVALUATING DUAL-CLASS STOCK 
STRUCTURES 
Developing such an understanding of existing dual-class 
sunrise and sunset provisions allows for informed discussion 
of the burgeoning competition for control between 
entrepreneurs and institutional investors. To evaluate dual-
class stock structures and establish criteria for considering 
different options for designing them, it is important, as an 
initial matter, to understand why they are sought by 
entrepreneurs and fought by investors.  
A. Entrepreneurs Seek Control to Execute Vision 
Entrepreneurs seek voting control of their companies post-
IPO in order to retain the freedom to pursue their unique 
visions for creating corporate value—their idiosyncratic 
visions—without worry that public shareholders will 
challenge their decisions or dismiss them from their positions 
as managers or directors of the firms they have built from the 
ground up.100 Goshen and Hamdani explain that this is a 
natural result of asymmetrical information and differences of 
opinion between founders and public investors.101 Because 
entrepreneurs naturally have information about their 
businesses that they are not able to make public for 
competitive reasons, and because they may have different 
opinions from public investors about the best ways to create 
value through their businesses, they worry that shareholders 
will prevent them from realizing their business plans. Control 
enables entrepreneurs to capture the value they attach to the 
execution of their idiosyncratic vision, which they believe will 
maximize corporate value and produce above-market returns 
 
100 See, Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 590. 
101 See generally id. 
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in the long term.102 Goshen and Hamdani’s theory is 
supported by the words of entrepreneurs themselves.103  
 
102 While capturing the value attached to the execution of an idea is 
essentially a non-pecuniary private benefit of control, Goshen and Hamdani 
argue that entrepreneurs also seek control in order to increase the size of 
the corporate pie—to increase pecuniary benefits generally available to all 
shareholders on a pro rata basis. They are not attempting to dictate the pie’s 
distribution (through the consumption of pecuniary private benefits of 
control, such as engaging in transactions that increase the size of the firm 
in order to justify higher compensation for management). Id. at 576. Instead 
of assuming that controlling shareholders are expropriators who are 
motivated by a desire to consume private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders, they assert that many controlling owners are instead 
motivated primarily by a desire to purse their idiosyncratic visions that they 
believe will increase the value of their firms to the benefit of all 
shareholders. Id. 
103 Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 
2008, at 102, 104 (noting that several entrepreneurs have told Wasserman 
“I’m the one with the vision and the desire to build a great company. I have 
to be the one running it”); Lee, supra note 50 (quoting Sunny Gupta, CEO 
and co-founder of Apptio, justifying a dual-class structure on the basis that 
the founders are the ones who “built the company from the ground up”). In 
Google’s 2004 Registration Statement, co-founder Larry Page emphasized 
the need for autonomy to pursue long-term projects that could create 
significant value for shareholders: 
 
In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a 
corporate structure that will make it harder for outside parties to 
take over or influence Google. This [dual-class] structure will also 
make it easier for our management team to follow the long term, 
innovative approach emphasized earlier . . . . 
The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team, 
especially Sergey [Brin] and me, with increasingly significant 
control over the company’s decisions and fate, as Google shares 
change hands . . .  New investors will fully share in Google’s long 
term economic future but will have little ability to influence its 
strategic decisions through their voting rights. 
. . . From the point of view of long term success in advancing 
a company’s core values, the structure has clearly been an 
advantage. 
Some academic studies have shown that from a purely 
economic point of view, dual class structures have not harmed the 
share price of companies . . . . 
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Entrepreneurs who do not have sufficient personal capital 
to own a controlling block of the equity shares of their 
companies may seek control through dual-class stock 
structures. These structures allow them to leverage their pro 
rata equity positions with special shares carrying more votes 
than the shares held by other shareholders with equal equity 
ownership. 
Entrepreneurs have sought dual-class share protection in 
greater numbers in recent years as activist investors and 
institutional investors have asserted themselves more 
actively in corporate governance matters.104 Proponents of 
private ordering in corporate governance argue that the rise 
of activist and institutional investors has created an 
environment in which directors and managers feel pressured 
to make decisions raising stock prices in the near term, as 
opposed to pursuing long-term plans for value creation.105 The 
precise magnitude of the increase in dual-class IPOs as a 
percentage of all IPOs is unclear, in part due to the 
definitional problems around dual-class share structures 
 
Google has prospered as a private company. We believe a 
dual-class voting structure will enable Google, as a public 
company, to retain many of the positive aspects of being private. 
 
Google, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), 29–
30 (Aug. 18, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/ 
000119312504142742/ds1a.htm [http://perma.cc/QR3A-EPDW]. In 
explaining the need for a recapitalization to introduce non-voting stock, 
Google’s entrepreneur-controllers repeated this theme: “Technology 
products often require significant investment over many years to fulfill their 
potential. For example, it took over three years to ship our first Android 
handset, and then another three years on top of that before the operating 
system truly reached critical mass.” Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin 
(Apr. 2012), https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2011 
[http://perma.cc/87CS-952J]. 
104 See David J. Berger, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, 
Presentation at the Meeting of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, 
Multi-Class Stock and the Modern Corporation: A View from the Left 
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described in the notes to Part II supra, but the trend towards 
more dual-class IPOs is clear.106 Among companies in the 
dual-class data set, twenty-three went public in the period 
2000–2009, while seventy-two went public in the period 2010–
2017.  
B. Investors Seek Control to Minimize Value 
Destruction 
Investors resist dual-class stock structures based on 
principle, insisting that one share, one vote is the only 
appropriate corporate governance norm, and based on 
concerns about value destruction through self-
aggrandizement or poor business decisions by founders.107 
Investors value control because it allows them to minimize 
agency costs and value destruction by exerting influence over 
corporate strategy, and electing directors who will dismiss 
managers who are destroying value. 
The traditional critique of dual-class stock structures is 
that they create significant incentives for entrenched 
management owners to seek pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
private benefits of control, misappropriating or destroying 
corporate value in the process.108 These efforts to divert 
 
106 One frequently cited statistic is that about fifteen percent of the 
technology companies that went public between 2012 and 2016 used dual-
class share structures, versus only eight percent of such companies between 
2007 and 2011. Maureen Farrell, Tech Founders Want IPO Riches Without 
Those Pesky Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2017, 12:24 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/control-geeks-tech-founders-want-ipo-
investors-not-their-input-1491236464 (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review) (citing data compiled by University of Florida finance professor 
Jay Ritter). 
107 See Richard Teitelbaum, Index Firms Take Issue with Nonvoting 
Rights, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
index-firms-take-issue-with-nonvoting-rights-1491739227 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review); Letter from Ken Bertsch, Council of 
Institutional Inv’rs (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/20170426% 
20CII%20comment%20S&P%20no%20vote%20share(1).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q35B-RYZD]. 
108 Traditionally, critics of dual-class share structures have argued 
that such ownership structures create significant risks of substantial 
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corporate value to individual purposes are referred to as 
agency costs. Leaving founders in control of companies post-
IPO presents risks of two kinds of agency costs: management 
agency costs and control agency costs. Management agency 
costs arise from mismanagement—including reduced 
commitment, shirking, and pursuit of acquisitions to increase 
size or achieve diversification without generating value.109 
Control agency costs involve takings—directly diverting 
pecuniary private benefits to the controller through excessive 
pay, related-party transactions, and other methods of 
diverting corporate value to the controller.110 
Control agency costs can be controlled through fiduciary 
duties and liability rules, giving courts the power to intervene 
and impose penalties on entrepreneur-controllers who take 
advantage of their positions to benefit themselves. 
Management agency costs are harder to limit than control 
agency costs because, by their nature, they are mostly subject 
to business judgment review.111 Courts cannot place 
themselves in the position of second-guessing management 
decisions about corporate strategy.112 
Some scholars argue that the risk of management agency 
costs increases over time—that is, even if the founder’s vision 
produces tremendous corporate value in the first few years 
after going public, either the business vision or the founder’s 
 
agency costs as controllers have incentives to seek private benefits of 
control. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. 
Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual-Class Equity: The 
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow 
Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 301–02 (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2000) (explaining the agency costs inherent in companies with 
controlling-minority structure, one of which includes dual-class stock 
structures); Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 565. 
109 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 581–82. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 587–88. 
112 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that “redress for [directors’] failures . . . must come 
from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of 
capital, and not from this Court”). 
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acumen to execute it decline in later years.113 If this occurs, 
the founder may be more apt to make poor business decisions 
that impose management agency costs on the shareholders. 
While there is no persuasive evidence that founder 
capabilities always atrophy with time, there are certainly 
firms that have withered under founder management after 
showing initial promise.114 Two recent articles in the financial 
literature suggest the value of the dual-class structure 
declines over time, but they have significant shortcomings.115 
 
113 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for 
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 604–05 (2017); see also 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia Law Sch., Dual Class Common Stock: The 
Transformation of Markets Meets the Transformation of Control (Mar. 22, 
2017) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (noting that the 
original owner’s influence over the vision of the company often wanes in the 
years after the IPO). 
114 Yahoo! is one example that people sometimes raise to illustrate 
atrophy of entrepreneurial vision over time since founder Jerry Yang 
became CEO of Yahoo! as it was eclipsed by Google and before it became the 
target of an unsolicited bid from Microsoft. However, while they remained 
directors for many years, Yang and David Filo, the other founder, had ceded 
day-to-day management of the firm to a professional manager—Tim 
Koogle—before its initial public offering. 
115 Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste argue that dual-class firms enjoy 
valuation premiums over similarly situated single-class firms, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q, at the time of their respective IPOs, but the premium 
dissipates over time and becomes a discount after six years from the IPO. 
Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual 
Class Firms 27–28 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
550/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3062895 [http://perma.cc/BW6A-YTAJ]. Apart from the fact that the 
attribution is purely speculative, there are other significant problems with 
their conclusions. First, they rely on the multi-class IPO database created 
by Professor Jay Ritter of the University of Florida. Id. at 16 (citing Jay R. 
Ritter, IPO Data, U. FLA. WARRINGTON C. BUS., 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [https://perma.cc/7WRN-
BGJM]). Ritter’s data includes many firms that are multi-class, but not 
dual-class, so there is no wedge between the economic and voting interests 
of insiders that have a class of shares different from the publicly listed class 
of shares. See id. (explaining the use of Ritter’s data to construct their 
sample). Second, their conclusions regarding valuation premiums rely on 
measurements using Simple Q, rather than Total Q, and as they note in 
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The risk of management agency costs can theoretically be 
mitigated through greater equity ownership of the company 
by the controller (i.e., forcing the controller to bear a greater 
share of the costs of poor decisions) or subjecting management 
to the market for corporate control. Concentrated ownership—
that is, control through ownership of a majority or other 
controlling position of common equity—can be expected to 
diminish management agency costs because the founder has 
a pro rata equity stake and internalizes all of the costs and 
benefits of management choices as much as other 
shareholders do.116 This promotes more discipline regarding 
management decisions and less incentive to pursue private 
benefits of control.117 
 
their paper, “the Total Q matched analysis favors dual class firms, and 
suggests the dual class structure may not be detrimental at all.” Id. at 30. 
A second recent financial paper also relies on Simple Q to come to 
conclusions similar to those in Cremers, Lauterbach and Pajuste. See 
Hyunseob Kim & Roni Michaely, Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of 
the Benefits of Dual-Class Structures 4–5 (Jul. 15, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3145209 
[http://perma.cc/G4S3-6NXU]. As a valuation measure, Total Q is superior 
to Simple Q because it includes intangible assets in the denominator, which 
are omitted from the denominator of the latter. See, e.g., Ryan H. Peters & 
Lucian A. Taylor, Intangible Capital and the Investment-Q Relation, 123 J. 
FIN. ECON. 251, 252–53 (2017). Tobin’s Q has, in any event, been seriously 
questioned as a means of measuring the effect of corporate governance 
changes on firm performance in both the financial and legal literature. See 
Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q 50 (Feb. 4, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3118020 [http://perma.cc/978S-7TAF]; Philip H. Dybvig & 
Mitch Warachka, Tobin’s Q Does Not Measure Firm Performance: Theory, 
Empirics and Alternatives 25 (Mar. 6, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1562444 
[http://perma.cc/9B3Z-NVYM]. 
116 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 591–93; see also Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312–13 (1976) 
(stating that as an owner-manager’s equity interest in a company is 
transferred to outside shareholders, agency costs increase). 
117 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 591–93; see also Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 116, at 312–13. 
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Dual-class stock structures, on the other hand, increase 
the risk of management agency costs, as controllers own less 
of the cash-flow rights in the company compared to other 
shareholders while retaining voting control. Dual-class 
controllers have “less skin in the game” and internalize a 
smaller portion of the costs of any mistakes they make in 
management decisions. With a smaller equity stake, or 
smaller claim to the cash flows of the company, the controller 
absorbs a smaller fraction of the negative effects of her 
decisions while continuing to capture the full private benefits 
of control.118 
Competition can also limit both management and control 
agency costs as controllers are compelled to use corporate 
resources for competitive advantage in the market rather 
than personal gain or pet projects.119 Competition can affect 
both dual-class controllers and concentrated ownership 
controllers. 
C. The Current Debate: Prohibition vs. Private 
Ordering 
At present, the competing claims of founders and investors 
for control of public companies in the United States have 
created a polarized debate regarding dual-class stock 
structures. Investor advocates argue that dual-class stock 
structures should be prohibited or strictly limited in time.120 
 
118  Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 602–04; Bebchuk et al., 
supra note 108, at 301. 
119 See Gilson, supra note 11, at 1658 (noting that when competition in 
the product market is sufficiently intense, the comparative advantage 
between monitoring by a controlling shareholder and by market-based 
monitoring converge); Mark J. Roe, Rents and their Corporate 
Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468–69, 1473 (2001). 
120 The Council of Institutional Investors, for instance, recently 
petitioned the New York Stock Exchange to require companies adopting 
dual-class structures to include time-based sunset provisions. Letter from 
Ash Williams, Chair, CII, Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, CII & Ken Bertsch, 
Exec. Dir., CII, to Elizabeth King, Chief Regulatory Officer, 
Intercontinential Exchange, Inc. (Oct. 24, 2018) [hereinafter “CII Letter to 
NYSE”], https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/ 
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Founder advocates argue that the current system of private 
ordering––through which founders choose their capital 
structure and invite investors to invest or not––is fair and 
efficient and should not be disturbed.121 Thus, participants in 
the U.S. capital markets are at loggerheads.  
1. Calls for Prohibition 
Institutional investors are pressing Nasdaq and the NYSE 
to change the rules of the game by prohibiting dual-class share 
structures altogether.122 They seek help from the exchanges 
and the SEC, which oversees the exchanges’ activities, 
because they do not like the results occurring in recent private 
bargaining between the parties to initial public offerings. 
Institutional investors suffer from a collective action problem 
in opposing dual-class structures.  
The problem is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma––
although, according to their anti-dual-class philosophy, all 
investors would be better off if no investors invested in dual-
class IPOs (because companies would be forced to adopt a one 
share, one vote stock structure), no investor wants to be the 
one left out if other investors invest in a dual-class company 




121 See, e.g., The Continuing Support for Dual-Class Stock by 




122 See CII Letter to NYSE, supra note 120. CII sent a similar letter to 
Nasdaq. Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, CII, Jeff Mahoney, Gen. 
Counsel, CII & Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., CII, to John Zecca, Senior Vice 
President, Gen. Counsel N. Am. and Chief Regulatory Officer, Nasdaq 
Stock Market (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_ 
advocacy/correspondence/2018/20181024%20NASDAQ%20Petition%20on
%20Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMK3-RBL8]. 
123 Andrew Winden & Andrew C. Baker, Dual-Class Index Exclusion 
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institutional investors to pass up promising investments even 
if they do not like the associated corporate governance 
structures, particularly if their competitors are investing 
despite any such dissatisfaction. For example, T. Rowe Price 
quickly backed away from an initial challenge of the non-
voting dual-class structure adopted by Snapchat owners in 
connection with its 2017 initial public offering.124 
The Council of Institutional Investors has acknowledged 
that competition for investment assets (such as retirement 
accounts) among asset managers makes it difficult for them to 
forgo investments in companies with dual-class share 
structures.125 Corporate governance professionals employed 
at institutional investors know that their portfolio managers 
will refuse to sell (or not buy) the shares of successful 
companies simply because the company adopted a dual-class 
structure and refuses to collapse them into a single-class.126  
In response to their collective action problem, institutional 
investors want to establish “one share, one vote” as an 
unshakeable bedrock principle of corporate governance–– 
even though state legislatures have not established such a 
principle in state corporate laws.127 In the absence of 
 
124  Stephen Babcock, T. Rowe Price Backs off Challenge to Snapchat 
IPO Plans, TECHNICAL.LY|BALT. (Jan. 20, 2017, 10:12 AM), 
https://technical.ly/baltimore/2017/01/20/t-rowe-price-snapchat-ipo/ 
[https://perma.cc/VHQ4-WHGY]; Paresh Dave, Big Investor T. Rowe Price 
Challenges Snapchat Founder’s Power, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017, 12:20 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snapchat-voting-
20170119-story.html [https://perma.cc/38ML-654V]. 
125 See Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, 
Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/video/webcast-archive-
player.shtml?document_id=030917iac [https://perma.cc/7WXH-YNVK]. 
126 See, e.g., Matt Levine, ISS Tells Investors How They Want to Vote, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
opinion/articles/2018-01-30/iss-tells-investors-how-they-want-to-vote 
[https://perma.cc/G2QK-2N3W]; see also John Crabb, Blue Apron’s No-Vote 
Shares IPO Concerns Investors, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3728513/Blue-Aprons-no-vote-shares-IPO-
concerns-investors.html [https://perma.cc/2SVA-BHBU]. 
127 See, e.g., CAL. STATE TEACHERS’ RET. SYS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES (2017), http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-
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statutory or regulatory prohibition, they directly lobby 
companies to refrain from adopting dual-class structures or to 
include strict time-based sunset provisions if they utilize 
them.128  
To bolster their calls for prohibition or extinction of dual-
class share structures, institutional investors sometimes 
argue that dual-class structures destroy corporate value. 
However, the empirical record on that issue is decidedly 
mixed. While a number of studies suggest that dual-class 
firms perform poorly compared to single class firms,129 other 
studies suggest that a dual-class structure can enhance firm 
 
attachments/corporate_governance_principles_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VXL7-BFZ3]; INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN 
VIEWPOINT, DIFFERENTIAL SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES: MITIGATING 
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL AT THE EXPENSE OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
(2017), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGN%20Viewpoint%20 
differential%20share%20ownership_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE4X-NZ54]; 
Letter from Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to Judith 
C. McLevey, Vice President, Corp. Actions & Mkt. Watch, NYSE Euronext 
(Dec. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Yerger Letter] (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review).  
128 See, e.g., Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies, 
supra note 9. 
129 Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The 
Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 85 (2008) (finding some support in the 
literature for the hypothesis that deviations from one share, one vote 
adversely affect the value of non-control equity); Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii 
& Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms 
in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084–85 (2010) (finding that 
firm value increases with insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreases with 
insiders’ voting rights); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency 
Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1721–22 (2009); Scott 
B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai & Chad J. Zutter, What’s in a Vote? 
The Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class Equity on IPO Firm Values, 
45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 94, 96 (2008); see also INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH 
CTR. INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD AND POOR’S 1500: A 
TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW (2012) (finding that non-
controlled firms outperformed controlled firms over a ten-year period ended 
August 31, 2012); KAMONJOH, supra note 15, at 10 (finding controlled 
companies underperformed non-controlled firms over all periods reviewed 
(one-, three-, five- and ten-year periods) with respect to total shareholder 
returns, revenue growth, return on equity, and dividend payout ratios). 
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value.130 One study concluded that founder-CEOs tend to 
retire from management when the firms they establish 
perform particularly well, and founder-CEOs have a positive 
effect on firm performance.131 So it is hard to conclude that 
founder control is clearly adverse to corporate value creation.  
 
130 Ekkehart Böhmer, Gary C. Sanger & Sanjay B. Varshney, The 
Effect of Consolidated Control on Firm Performance: The Case of Dual-Class 
IPOs, in EMPIRICAL ISSUES IN RAISING EQUITY CAPITAL 95, 115 (Mario Levis 
ed., 1996) (finding for a sample of ninety-eight dual-class IPOs that dual-
class firms outperform their single-class counterparts matched for 
exchange, offer date, industry and size in terms of stock-market returns as 
well as accounting measures of firm performance); Thomas J. Chemmanur 
& Yawen Jiao, Dual-Class IPOs: A Theoretical Analysis, 36 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 305, 306 (2012) (creating a model predicting that dual-class IPO firms 
are likely to outperform (underperform) single class IPO firms if the 
reputation of the incumbent is high (low) and the firm is operating in an 
industry where the difference in intrinsic values between the projects with 
high and low near-term uncertainty is large (small));Valentin Dimitrov & 
Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into Dual-
Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342 (2006) 
(finding a group of 178 firms that recapitalized from one-share one-vote into 
a dual-class structure between 1979 and 1998 experienced, on average, 
significant positive abnormal returns of 23.11% in a period of four years 
following the announcement of the recap, with higher abnormal returns 
accruing when additional equity is issued to grow the firm). 
131 Renée Adams, Heitor Almeida & Daniel Ferreira, Understanding 
the Relationship Between Founder-CEOs and Firm Performance, 16 J. 
EMPIRICAL FIN. 136, 136 (2009) (finding that good performance makes it less 
likely that the founder retains the CEO title and that, after factoring out 
the effect of performance on founder-CEO status, there is a positive causal 
effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance that is quantitatively larger 
than the effect estimated through standard OLS regressions). Reid Hoffman 
of LinkedIn comes to mind. In fact, he is on record saying that he brought 
in an outside CEO because he knew he was not interested in the challenges 
of managing process in a large firm. However, he retained voting control of 
the company. Reid Hoffman, If, Why, and How Founders Should Hire a 
“Professional” CEO, REIDHOFFMAN.ORG (Jan. 21, 2013), 
https://www.reidhoffman.org/if-why-and-how-founders-should-hire-a-
professional-ceo-2/ [https://perma.cc/LQ9B-C4HH]; Cromwell Schubarth, 
Reid Hoffman: Why CEO Founders Should Stay and Why I Didn’t at 
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2. Support for Private Ordering Status Quo 
In the absence of specific stock exchange or other 
regulatory requirements for dual-class capital structures, 
such structures are currently adopted through private 
ordering. That is, there is an implicit bargain regarding the 
governance of the company being struck between the 
entrepreneur and public investors at the time of an initial 
public offering. The entrepreneur offers investors a right to a 
pro rata share of the cash flows generated by the 
entrepreneur’s enterprise in exchange for an investment of 
capital and investors’ acceptance of the entrepreneur’s control 
of the enterprise, subject to whatever limitations on that 
control are incorporated into the charter of the company and 
the underlying corporate law. Investors in a dual-class 
company make a bet on the founder and the founder’s vision 
for creating corporate value––hopefully generating above-
market returns on investment. 
In the private ordering model, which depends on 
contractual freedom and market efficiency, investors and 
entrepreneurs can adopt different combinations of cash flow 
and control rights to balance entrepreneurs’ interests in 
pursuing their idiosyncratic vision and investors’ desire for 
protection from agency costs.132 The outcome of negotiations 
regarding these combinations of rights depends on each 
party’s relative bargaining power, and bargaining power 
depends in part on market dynamics. When a large amount of 
private capital is available and there is an insufficient supply 
of good new business ideas, or when an entrepreneur has a 
particularly compelling business idea or demonstrated ability 
to build a business, the entrepreneur can get better terms, 
including, in some cases, a dual-class stock structure.133 With 
a less compelling business idea, particularly if private capital 
for investment in start-ups is scarce, the entrepreneur will get 
 
132 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 585–86. 
133 Id. (citing Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 
463, 493 (1996) (finding that venture capital’s use of covenants is related 
to supply and demand in the venture-capital industry)). 
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less favorable terms and may have to give up the dual-class 
structure in order to go public or obtain sufficient capital to 
grow the business.  
Thus, it should not be a surprise that in the current 
market, in which there is more capital than ideas and 
talent,134 a significant number of entrepreneurs are able to 
convince investors that they ought to be permitted to retain 
control of their company following an initial public offering, 
and investors are willing to invest in promising companies 
despite their distaste for corporate governance features that 
entrench the entrepreneur in control of the company. Indeed, 
some of today’s dual-class companies (e.g., Alphabet, 
Facebook) are among the most successful companies in the 
world.135  
Proponents of private ordering support their position by 
noting that no one is forced to accept the founder’s terms for 
investment––investors can always choose not to invest, and 
the risks of agency costs created by the dual-class governance 
model are priced into the IPO share price by the market, 
which has the ability to assess and price such risks.136 If we 
 
134 See Will Gaybrick, Tech’s Ultimate Success: Software Developers Are 




135 See David J. Berger, Dual-Class Stock and Private Ordering: A 
System that Works, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 
24, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05-24/dual-class-stock-
and-private-ordering-a-system-that-works/ [https://perma.cc/P23L-HDR7] 
(arguing that the current private ordering system works and dual-class 
arrangements are in part a response to short-termism in the financial 
markets). 
136 Stephen Bainbridge, Bebchuk and Kastiel’s Paternalistic Take on 
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 11, 2017), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2017/05/bebc
huk-and-kastiels-paternalistic-take-on-perpetual-dual-class-stock.html 
[https://perma.cc/3GB7-NN9W]. But see, Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 
113, at 622 (arguing that while “IPO buyers might pay attention to and price 
a salient feature like a dual-class structure, they might not similarly price 
more subtle features, such as the presence and specifics of a sunset 
provision.”). 
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assume that markets are efficient, the governance structure 
should be priced into the value and offering price of a company 
at the time of its IPO. Thus, advocates of private ordering 
argue that if the entrepreneur is willing to accept a lower 
value for the company at the time of the IPO, and investors 
are willing to purchase shares at the market price for a chance 
to benefit from the entrepreneur’s vision, a fair bargain is 
struck. Accordingly, investors should not seek voting rights 
they have not paid for (with respect to existing dual-class 
companies) or advocate for prohibition of a corporate 
governance model that has been accepted by the market and 
produced significant value for the world economy. 
In the private ordering model, markets adjust for poor 
management decisions by terminating managers or divesting. 
In the case of dual-class companies, termination is not an 
option for investors, since the entrepreneur controls the vote. 
Thus, the only available response to mismanagement is exit, 
which may or may not be an available option, depending on 
the investor’s business model.137 Even where available, 
selling shares may, in any event, only arise too late to avoid 
the value destruction caused by entrepreneur-controllers who 
are not effectively accountable to the market. Critics of the 
current private ordering status quo conclude that rules 
limiting the use of dual-class governance structures are 
 
137 Institutional investors typically say that they are not able to “just 
sell,” or do the “Wall Street Walk,” if they are dissatisfied with the 
management of an entrepreneur-controller because they often invest in a 
manner intended to follow the market or important indices such as the S&P 
500, meaning they must own every company in the relevant index, 
regardless of corporate governance structure and management decisions. 
See, e.g., Yerger Letter, supra note 127 (stating that “[d]ue to their heavy 
use of passive strategies, CII members are unable to exercise the ‘Wall 
Street Walk’ and simply sell if they are dissatisfied”); see also Rakhi Kumar, 
Managing Dir., Head of ESG Investments and Asset Stewardship, State St. 
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necessary to protect investors against such value 
destruction.138 
The next Section suggests that dual-class stock structures 
can obtain enhanced legitimacy by focusing on the 
fundamental goals of the parties to a corporate charter 
agreement (their mutually ideal complete contract). The goal 
of the founder is unimpeded pursuit of a vision of value 
creation and the goals of investors are voice and influence on 
management decisions. As explained in Part VII, there are 
numerous ways in which dual-class stock structures can be 
designed to satisfy both goals, making prohibition or strict 
time limitation unnecessary. 
D. Alternative Standards for Assessing Dual-Class 
Stock Structures 
In evaluating the terms of dual-class stock structures, it is 
important to start at the beginning––the fundamental deal 
struck between the buyers and sellers of such structures. As 
noted above, the deal is a capital investment by investors in 
exchange for a claim on some of the value created by the 
entrepreneur’s vision. Where the entrepreneur is not 
investing in the enterprise with other investors on a one-to-
one pro rata basis, investors are essentially making their 
investment decision based only on their belief in the founder’s 
vision and their desire to own a piece of it.139 Because the 
entrepreneur’s economic skin in the game is comparatively 
low, the importance of the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision 
is particularly high. 
In light of this bargain between founders and investors, the 
terms of the dual-class stock structure should be designed and 
evaluated based on the extent to which they are necessary to 
 
138 See, e.g., Blair A. Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, The Rising Tide of 
Dual-Class Shares: Recipe for Executive Entrenchment, Underperformance, 
and Erosion of Shareholder Rights, NAPPA REP., Apr. 2017, at 4 (“If the only 
solution is for investors to abandon certain investments after dual-class 
systems have done their damage, owners lose out financially and 
discussions in corporate boardrooms and C-suites across the country will 
suffer from a lack of diversity, perspective, and accountability.”). 
139 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 595 n.107. 
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support the idiosyncratic vision for value creation held by the 
founder, while minimizing the costs to investors. The 
structure should give the founder unfettered discretion to 
pursue the vision, but not more than necessary. The structure 
should also protect investors by giving them some influence 
over management, but not the ability to control over the 
strategic direction of the company or election of its managers.  
Particularly in the current market environment of 
abundant capital chasing a limited number of visions for value 
creation, a system that provides entrepreneurs too little 
protection may discourage or prevent them from pursuing 
visions that could create significant value, leading to a loss for 
society. Conversely, a system that gives entrepreneurs too 
much protection may lead to unacceptable levels of 
management agency costs through value destroying, good-
faith management mistakes regarding asset allocation, even 
if no conflicted or otherwise self-aggrandizing aggregations of 
pecuniary private benefits of control are present.140  
On the other hand, if institutional investors are successful 
in their campaign to abolish dual-class structures or to impose 
strict time-based sunsets on them, the result may very well be 
an acceleration of business trends that are already emerging 
in the United States. More companies would stay private 
longer, leading to diminished opportunities for investment by 
retail investors and less publicly available information about 
the most vibrant engines of growth in the economy. Why go 
public and lose control of your company when you can get the 
capital you need to grow in the private markets, retain control 
 
140 It is also possible that in some cases entrepreneur-controllers make 
poor corporate management decisions based on the pursuit of non-pecuniary 
private benefits of control. Entrepreneur-controllers may, for instance, 
make business decisions based on pride, fame or personal satisfaction, see 
Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits 
of Control 5–6 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
131/2009, 2009),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1448164 [https://perma.cc/R47D-XZJW] (explaining how idiosyncratic non-
pecuniary private benefits of control affect business decisions), or enter into 
businesses they do not know well but find personally alluring. See Kobi 
Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 
2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 118–19 (2016). 
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and avoid the harsh spotlight of public disclosure of your 
business activities and results of operations? Private ordering 
may permit some inefficient results, but prohibition or 
significant limitation of dual-class structures could have 
adverse macro-economic effects by discouraging 
entrepreneurs from going public and growing their 
enterprises using the additional capital available in public 
markets.  
Entrepreneurs often face a trade-off between acquiring 
additional capital to grow their firms and retaining control 
over the enterprise they have created.141 If entrepreneurs are 
able to convince private or public investment markets that 
they have sufficiently compelling idiosyncratic visions for 
value creation and that they deserve protection from 
termination through the creation of dual-class share 
structures, they can pursue the growth of their firms without 
fear of losing control over them. If entrepreneurs are 
prohibited from relying on dual-class structures to enhance 
their voting strength even as their economic interest in their 
firm declines, they may choose not to seek value-enhancing 
capital infusions lest they lose control of their vision. Noam 
Wasserman has shown that entrepreneurs sometimes choose 
not to grow their companies if they fear seeking the capital 
necessary to grow will cause them to lose control.142 For 
example, in his recent autobiography, Phil Knight suggested 
that he would not have been willing to take Nike public 
without the right to retain control of the board.143 Nasdaq 
 
141 See Noam Wasserman, The Throne Vs. the Kingdom: Founder 
Control and Value Creation in Startups, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 255, 256 
(2017) (arguing “founders face a ‘control dilemma’ in which a startup’s 
resource dependence drives a wedge between the startup’s value and the 
founder’s ability to retain control of decision making” and finding that in a 
unique data set of 6130 U.S. startups, those in which the founder is still in 
control of the board of directors and/or the CEO position are significantly 
less valuable than those in which the founder has given up control, with 
each additional level of founder control (i.e., controlling the board and/or the 
CEO position) reducing the pre-money valuation of the startup by 17.1%–
22.0%, on average). 
142 See Wasserman, supra note 103, at 108. 
143 PHIL KNIGHT, SHOE DOG 329–30 (2016). 
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recently issued a report on market reforms––in an effort to 
reverse the U.S. trend of fewer and fewer public companies––
in which it voiced support for dual-class stock structures that 
offer founders flexibility in making the decision to go public.144 
Goshen and Hamdani argue that entrepreneurs should be 
permitted to contract with investors for uncontestable control 
in order to pursue their idiosyncratic visions.145 Thereafter, 
the entrepreneur-controller’s right to make management 
decisions should be afforded property-rule protection––that is, 
it should only be taken away with the owner’s consent.146 The 
uncontestable and (most often) indefinite control an 
entrepreneur has in a dual-class context provides the 
entrepreneur with the maximum ability to realize her 
idiosyncratic vision, which can benefit both the entrepreneur 
and her investors. However, the entrepreneur’s smaller equity 
claim as compared to concentrated ownership leaves investors 
with relatively high exposure to agency costs.147  
Because of this relatively high risk, investors have a 
particularly acute need for a voice––a means to hold 
management accountable––in the context of dual-class 
companies. The heart of the challenge in resolving the contest 
for control between entrepreneurs and institutional investors 
is finding a way to protect investors from management agency 
costs––essentially, the prospect of poor management decisions 
made by a manger with uncontested discretion. A well-
designed package of dual-class sunrise and sunset provisions 
 
144 NASDAQ, THE PROMISE OF MARKET REFORM: REIGNITING AMERICA’S 
ECONOMIC ENGINE 17 (2018) (“One of America’s greatest strengths is that 
we are a magnet for entrepreneurship and innovation. Central to 
cultivating this strength is establishing multiple paths entrepreneurs can 
take to public markets. Each publicly-traded company should have 
flexibility to determine a class structure that is most appropriate and 
beneficial for them, so long as this structure is transparent and disclosed 
up-front so that investors have complete visibility into the company. Dual-
class structures allow investors to invest side-by-side with innovators and 
high growth companies, enjoying the financial benefits of these companies’ 
success.”). 
145 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 598–99. 
146 Id. at 601. 
147 Id. at 590–91. 
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will give entrepreneurs the security and discretion they seek 
while protecting investors from the risk of material value 
destruction through poor decisions by offering investors a 
means to influence the entrepreneur’s decisions, if not to 
interfere with them.  
Thus, in evaluating the terms of dual-class stock 
structures, the parties should ask the following questions: 
Does the term support pursuit of the entrepreneur’s 
idiosyncratic vision? Does the term contemplate a means for 
investors to influence management? Is the term necessary to 
avoid agency costs? Is there a less restrictive means to avoid 
agency costs? Through an examination of these questions, it 
is possible to provide investors with more protection from 
agency costs than they typically have in current dual-class 
stock structures but without prohibiting or severely limiting 
the use of such capital structures to promote the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial visions for value creation. In fact, as 
discussed in Part VII, there are multiple different approaches 
that could be used to protect investors more effectively 
without prohibition or time-limitation of the structures.  
VII. DESIGNING OPTIMAL DUAL-CLASS 
STRUCTURES 
A. Summary 
The genius of American corporate law is its flexibility. The 
survey of dual-class sunrise and sunset structures in Parts II 
and III above show that there are many ways to approach a 
dual-class share structure and it should be possible to design 
multiple different structures that meet the needs of both 
entrepreneurs and investors. Prohibition and strict time-
based limitation are neither necessary nor appropriate given 
the plethora of other alternatives, even if one is not 
comfortable with the status quo result arising from 
unrestricted private ordering.  
The optimal dual-class capital structure will be driven by 
the characteristics of a given situation and should be 
negotiated among the parties prior to an initial public offering 
considering the nature of the company and its vision, the 
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strength of the vision, the personal qualities of the 
entrepreneur, the industry of the company, the capital profile 
and spending requirements of the company, the availability of 
alternatives to going public, and any other factors deemed 
material by the parties.148 One size does not fit all, and 
allowing the market to decide the terms of control for each 
company should, in aggregate, result in the best allocation of 
resources to means of productivity and division of control 
between entrepreneurs and investors. 149  
The optimal structure will typically arise from an 
appropriate mix of sunrise and sunset provisions. If the 
founder insists on issuing only no vote shares to public 
investors, a time-based sunset may be appropriate, so the 
 
148 As noted supra Part V, a company typically has a capital structure 
in place before filing a registration statement with the SEC, launching the 
deal, and embarking upon the “road show” marketing tour in which it 
pitches the deal to investors. However, the initial public offering 
underwriting process provides an excellent forum in which founders, their 
counsel, their bankers, and investors can assess the merits of a dual-class 
structure. Investment bankers often organize “testing the waters” meetings 
between founder/CEOs and potential investors prior to filing a registration 
statement, which provide an opportunity to determine which entrepreneurs 
have idiosyncratic visions that merit dual-class protection and which do not, 
as well as the details of the dual-class structure for each company. See, e.g., 
Ned Welsh, Testing the Waters, MOFOJUMPSTARTER.COM (Mar. 11, 
2014), https://www.mofojumpstarter.com/2014/03/11/testing-the-waters/ 
[https://perma.cc/G3JS-JN8J]. 
149 Ronald Gilson, Evaluating Dual-Class Common Stock: The 
Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 828 n.56 (1987) (the market 
mechanism allows beneficial recapitalizations and financings to continue 
while deterring transactions that tend to disenfranchise and transfer 
wealth from public shareholders to insiders without appropriate 
compensation); Martin Lipton, New Theory in Corporate Governance 
Undermines Theories Relied on by Proponents of Short-Termism and 
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Nov. 25, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/25/new-theory-in-
corporate-governance-undermines-theories-relied-on-by-proponents-of-
short-termism-and-shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/JAD5-J2H4] 
(referring to Goshen and Squire’s Principal Costs, and noting that the 
division of control between managers and investors that minimizes the sum 
of principal costs and agent costs is firm-specific, driven by factors such as 
industry, business strategy and personal characteristics of the manager and 
investors). 
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period in which investors have no voice is limited. If public 
investors have the right to elect a minority of the directors on 
the board, the nature of the sunset provisions will be less 
important since investors have a significant avenue for input 
on and review of management decisions, including strategies 
that could lead to a diminution in corporate value, leading to 
management agency costs.  
If a dual-class company adopts a minority director election 
provision, the nature of the voting and sunset provisions will 
be less important, but still offer opportunities for tailoring in 
light of the lessons of idiosyncratic vision theory. Generally, 
voting shares will be preferable to non-voting shares due to 
the lack of accountability and shareholder voice associated 
with non-voting shares. The precise ratio of high to low voting 
shares is less important, but a higher ratio is a preferable 
means to manage the founder’s concerns about dilution over 
time, since it preserves a voice for shareholders in the 
company.  
With respect to sunset provisions, time-based sunsets and 
dilution sunsets are generally inconsistent with supporting 
the realization of an idiosyncratic vision for value creation and 
should generally be avoided. Divestment, death, and 
separation sunsets are consistent with supporting an 
entrepreneurial vision for value creation, and should 
generally be included in the structure for dual-class 
companies. Other sunsets that put pressure on founders to 
focus on the efficient realization of their value enhancing 
vision without arbitrary or dis-incentivizing limitations 
include fiduciary and performance sunsets, which penalize 
founders for fiduciary breaches and failure to meet 
performance expectations.150  
The terms of a dual-class structure should accurately 
reflect the quality of a founder’s idiosyncratic vision for 
creating above market returns, including the nature of the 
business, the position of the company in the market, and the 
talent of the company’s management. There is significant 
 
150 This author is not aware of any companies that have instituted such 
sunset provisions to date. 
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room for flexibility within the dual-class structure to give 
some founders a greater benefit of the doubt (or a longer leash) 
than others in designing the structure. In a situation where a 
founder insists on a dual-class structure despite a dubious 
business model or lackluster talent, it may in fact be 
appropriate to include a time-based sunset provision, 
although as a theoretical matter it is still preferable to utilize 
a less arbitrary sunset tied to performance expectations or 
failures.  
B. Sunrise Provisions 
1. Voting Structure 
Issuing only non-voting shares to public investors is a 
suboptimal approach to retaining founder control of a public 
company. While issuing non-voting stock to the public allows 
founders to improve the value of their company by using 
equity to raise capital, incentivize employees, and acquire 
accretive businesses without fear of losing control, there are 
numerous drawbacks to listing only non-voting shares. The 
shareholders’ voice becomes extremely attenuated when 
management has no obligation to submit any matters to a vote 
of the public shareholders. SEC Rule 14a-8 under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which monitors the 
shareholder proposal process, is premised on shareholders 
holding voter shares.151 The SEC’s say-on-pay voting 
requirement arguably applies under Rule 14a-21 only when a 
company is soliciting votes from shareholders for election of 
directors at an annual meeting pursuant to a Schedule 14A 
proxy statement.152 If no public shareholder vote is required 
because the issuer has only non-voting shares listed, the 
issuer would use Schedule 14C, the proxy form used for 
annual meetings at which no vote of the public shareholders 
will take place, and Rule 14a-21 would not apply.153 As a 
result, investors will effectively have no measurable voice, and 
 
151 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2018). 
152 Id. § 240.14a–101; id. § 240.14a–21. 
153 Id. § 240.14c–101. 
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management will have little incentive to listen to their 
concerns about the direction of the company’s strategy. The 
absence of investor voice is ultimately an issue of 
accountability.154 
Listing both voting and non-voting shares is less 
worrisome than listing only non-voting shares, because as 
long as there is a voting class of common equity listed, the 
accountability issues described above will be ameliorated. 
Some dual-class companies have taken this approach.155 
Another alternative to listing non-voting shares in an initial 
public offering is listing low voting shares but authorizing the 
issuance of future non-voting shares, if necessary, in the IPO 
charter.156 In that case, public shareholders have arguably 
 
154 Anne Simpson of CalPERS, a member of the SEC’s Investor 
Advisory Committee, stated at the Committee’s March 9, 2017 hearing on 
Unequal Voting Rights of Common Stock that shareholders ceding power 
without accountability is the primary problem with non-voting shares 
specifically and dual-class share structures more generally. Anne Simpson, 
Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/video/webcast-archive-
player.shtml?document_id=030917iac [https://perma.cc/7WXH-YNVK]. 
155 See, e.g., Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000008/go
og10-kq42016.htm [https://perma.cc/X4WK-SEZB]; Brown-Forman Co., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (June 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/14693/000001469316000160/bfb-2016430x10k.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9FQK-HJE6]; CBS Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000081382816 
000065/cbs_10k-123115.htm [https://perma.cc/PZ27-5UK9]; Discovery 
Comm’n, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1437107/000143710718000028/di
sca-2017123110k.htm [https://perma.cc/LSS2-7H7Y]; Under Armour, Inc., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000133691717000017/ua-20161231x10k.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BPN2-9EP9]; Viacom, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
(Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1339947/ 
000133994715000042/via2015093010k.htm [https://perma.cc/5JD7-YPYR]. 
See also Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
156 This is the approach taken by Blue Apron, Inc. in its recent IPO. See 
Blue Apron, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) 
(June 19, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1701114/ 
000104746917004085/a2232430zs-1a.htm [https://perma.cc/R8AD-TPBN]. 
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agreed to such future issuances in agreeing to invest at the 
time of the initial public offering. Assuming adequate 
disclosure and risk factors regarding the possibility of offering 
non-voting shares in the future, it would not be necessary to 
make any payments to the public shareholders in connection 
with future issuances of the non-voting shares. As a practical 
matter, no later approval of a charter amendment by 
shareholders—the issue that became a challenge for 
Facebook—would be necessary. Furthermore, as a policy 
matter, any issuance would not constitute the kind of mid-
course correction requiring restitution discussed by Goshen 
and Hamdani.157 
Another alternative to listing non-voting shares is a 
change in the ratio of votes between the high and low voting 
shares to ensure that future issuances of low voting shares for 
compensation, capital raising, and acquisition purposes do not 
dilute founders out of their control position in the company. 
There are no rules that require the ratio to be 10:1. As noted 
in Part III, supra, although 10:1 is the overwhelmingly most 
common ratio, there are some companies with other ratios. A 
founder concerned about losing control through future equity 
issuances can establish an initial ratio that is more 
impervious to dilution, such as 50:1 or 100:1.  
2. Minority Directors 
A large number of companies that adopted dual-class 
structures from the mid-70s to the mid-80s, when the NYSE 
refused to list companies with a dual-class structure, did so 
through the AMEX, which had rules requiring that minority 
shareholders have the power to elect a minority of the board 
of directors.158 
This option may be the best compromise between 
entrepreneurs’ desire for management discretion and 
investors’ desire for protection from poor management 
decisions. If investors are not able to rely on market discipline 
 
157 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 608–10. 
158 Seligman, supra note 23, at 703. Nike is a striking example of a 
company that continues to operate on this basis. 
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or bundling of control and cash flow rights to ameliorate the 
risks of management agency costs, giving investors one or 
more representatives on the board of directors is an important 
concession that can give investors a voice and mitigate the 
risk of such agency costs. 
The introduction of minority director elections may work 
better for entrepreneur-controllers than time-based sunset 
provisions that might trigger before the entrepreneur-
controller’s idiosyncratic vision for value creation is 
completely achieved. On the other hand, with the introduction 
of minority director elections, investors have an advocate in 
the boardroom. This may make it more difficult for 
entrepreneur-controllers to engage in long-term large-scale 
investments of corporate assets in losing propositions, 
particularly those that are based more on personal allure 
(non-pecuniary private benefits of control) than realistic 
visions for enhancing corporate value.  
To be effective, this right should be coupled with proxy 
access and a clear right to nominate the minority directors. 
There is a significant likelihood that candidates nominated by 
a board elected by the founder will not be sufficiently 
independent to give minority investors a true voice in board 
deliberations. Accordingly, it is important that the minority 
investors’ right to elect a certain percentage of the board be 
coupled with a right to nominate an equivalent number of 
directors and have those nominees included in the corporate 
proxy for consideration by shareholders along with other 
director nominees. 
Management agency costs can be mitigated through an 
effective mechanism to allow public investors to nominate and 
elect a minority of the directors to the board. One or more 
truly independent representatives of the public investors can 
voice concerns about the amount or nature of capital 
investments or research and development expenses being 
devoted to particular projects of the company. Additionally, 
they can also voice concerns about the wisdom of an 
acquisition or the proposed price. At the end of the day, the 
founder will control the board and be able to obtain support 
for decisions that are consistent with the founder’s 
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idiosyncratic vision for value creation. However, the founder 
will also benefit from truly independent alternative 
perspectives provided by genuine representatives of the public 
investors.  
Of course, introducing investor representatives to the 
board of directors is not without risks. Dual-class companies 
permitting public investors to elect a minority of the board are 
necessarily more vulnerable to activist investors, who can 
seek to place representatives in those seats, and, in fact, are 
targeted by activist investors twice as much as dual-class 
companies without such minority director representation.159 
Activist investors have used this access to force some dual-
class companies to collapse their capital structures into a 
single class.160 
C. Sunset Provisions 
1. Time-Based Sunsets 
In light of concerns about the risk of founder vision atrophy 
and increased agency costs over time, Bebchuk and Kastiel 
have argued, in their article The Untenable Case for Perpetual 
Dual-class Stock, that if dual-class stock structures are not 
abolished, they should at least be required to include a time-
 
159 See Kastiel, supra note 140, at 95 (noting a sample of 193 dual-class 
firms shows that forty-three percent of all dual-class firms that grant public 
investors rights to elect a minority of directors experienced at least one 
activist event over a ten-year period from 2005 to 2014 as compared to 
twenty percent of all dual-class firms without such a structure). 
160 Hubbell Incorporated reclassified into a single class of common 
stock in December, 2015. See Hubbell Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 
23, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/48898/000 
119312515412174/d110573d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/494J-FNA6]; Ed 
Hammond & Stephen Foley, Falcone Targets Dual-Class Share Hurdle, FIN. 
TIMES (June 25, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/6b5f1726-fb99-11e3-
aa19-00144feab7de (on file with The Columbia Business Law Review); 
Update: Hubbell-Change in Trustee to Hubbell Family Trusts Has Moved 
Class A Shares from Steep Discount to Premium, SEEKING ALPHA (July 28, 
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based sunset provision that is renewable at the discretion of 
the common stockholders.161 Their concerns may be bolstered 
by recent financial studies suggesting the value of dual-class 
stock structures declines over time.162 
Despite this, time-based sunsets generally are not part of 
an optimal set of sunset provisions. The time-based sunsets 
currently in use are effectively arbitrary—they do not appear 
to be related in any way to the achievement or failure of any 
aspect of an entrepreneur-controller’s idiosyncratic vision, 
short- or long-term performance, or value metrics.163 While it 
might be possible to estimate how long it ought to take to 
realize the value of the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision, 
any such estimate, which may or may not be correct, is just 
that—an estimate. Sunset provisions reliant on estimates of 
how much discretion an entrepreneur needs are inconsistent 
with Goshen and Hamdani’s idea that the entrepreneur 
should have a property right in control for purposes of 
pursuing an idiosyncratic vision and should not be forced to 
give up control without consent.164 Time-based sunsets are 
hostile to entrepreneurial discretion and reflect a strict view 
that the entrepreneur-controller’s control of the company 
should simply end at some pre-determined time in the future. 
When insisting on a time-based sunset provision, 
shareholders are essentially telling the entrepreneur-
controller, “You only get X years. That’s it.” That is a blunt 
instrument, not calibrated to resolve the tension between the 
entrepreneur’s desire for protection from interference or 
termination and the investors’ desire for protection from poor 
management decisions that may or may not occur. 
 
161 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 617–21. 
162 See supra note 115. 
163 In terms of stock price performance among companies that have 
incorporated a time-based sunset provision in their charter, five 
experienced precipitous stock price declines post-IPO, seven experienced 
significant stock price gains following their IPO, and four meandered 
around their IPO price. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
164 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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One argument Bebchuk and Kastiel make in favor of time-
based sunsets is that they are similar to the lifespans of 
private equity funds165—another situation in which investors 
give the managers of their investment’s significant discretion 
regarding asset allocation with little or no ability to influence 
the choice of manager over time. As noted above, a plurality 
of the time-based sunsets observed in this data set were set at 
the seventh anniversary of the listing of the company, while a 
few were set at ten years. This period is similar to the 
lifespans of private equity funds, which tend to be around ten 
years.166 Bebchuk and Kastiel suggest that the limited life of 
private equity funds represents an implicit understanding 
that the advantages of superior business leadership acumen 
tend to fade with time.167 
In the case of private funds, however, investors are 
typically locked into the investment for the life of the fund, 
with few exceptions allowing early redemptions.168 On the 
other hand, investors in a public company with a dual-class 
structure are legally free to sell their positions in highly liquid 
markets at any time.169 They can vote with their feet if they 
no longer believe in the idiosyncratic vision of an 
entrepreneur-controller. Furthermore, investors in private 
equity funds do not typically gain the power to replace the 
asset manager at the end of the fund’s life. Instead, they are 
allowed to withdraw their capital and invest it elsewhere—a 
 
165 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 605–06. 
166 Id. 
167 See Id. at 606. This conclusion is questionable. While it may be true 
that investors prefer not to place their investment with a particular asset 
manager for an indefinite period, the life spans of private equity funds may 
be more related to the expected period required to source investments and 
achieve improvements in the businesses of the invested companies than to 
an understanding that the asset manager’s ability may fade over time. 
168 Addison D. Braendel & Seth Chertok, Closed-End Private Equity 
Funds: A Detailed Overview of Fund Business Terms, Part II, 13 J. PRIV. 
EQUITY 57, 60 (2010). 
169 Index funds and asset managers mimicking them are a practical 
exception, though in terms of their legal rights there are no limits to 
divestment. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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right that investors in public dual-class companies have at all 
times.  
Investors in public dual-class companies also have 
significantly greater protections than investors in private 
equity or other investment funds. They are protected by 
fiduciary duties, generally have a voice in the management of 
the company (however small it may be), and have access to 
much more information about the company with which to 
make informed investment decisions. The managers of private 
investment funds are able to contract out of their fiduciary 
duties to fund investors and frequently do.170 By contrast, the 
managers and controlling stockholders of public companies, 
including companies with a dual-class structure, are subject 
to significant fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as 
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.171 As public 
companies with shares registered with the SEC, they also 
have significantly greater disclosure obligations regarding 
their results of operations and business trends.172 Thus, 
investors in private equity and venture capital funds have far 
fewer protections than investors in public dual-class 
companies, and the lifespans for such funds do not necessarily 
 
170 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005) (permitting expansion, 
restriction, or elimination of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); Id. § 
18-1101(c) (2005) (same in limited liability companies); Lloyd L. Drury III, 
Publicly-Held Private Equity Firms and The Rejection of Law as a 
Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57 (2013); Mohsen Manesh, What is 
the Practical Importance of Default Rules Under Delaware LLC and LP 
Law?, HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 121–22 (2012); Yves Smith, 
Presentation Shows Private Equity Investors Knowingly Sign Contracts with 
Waivers of Fiduciary Duty, Other Terms Stacked Against Them, 




171 These obligations are summarized in the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, pts. IV & V (AM. LAW 
INST. 1994). 
172 Compare Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) with Use of 
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 et. seq. (2018). 
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justify a similarly limited period of managerial discretion for 
the entrepreneur-controllers of dual-class companies.  
Another argument for time-based sunsets is that 
entrepreneur-controllers have incentives to retain control 
even when it would be more economically efficient to unify the 
capital structure or sell control. Bebchuk and Kastiel explain 
that because controllers gain only a fraction of the efficiency 
benefits associated with eliminating inefficient dual-class 
structures, despite giving up all of their private benefits of 
control, efficient sales or unifications may not take place in a 
substantial range of situations in which the entrepreneur-
controller’s management of the company has become 
inefficient.173 With a smaller fraction of equity capital owned 
by the controller and a larger amount of the private benefits 
of control, the controller has an incentive to refuse a wider 
range of efficient sales or unifications. Bebchuk and Kastiel 
do not suggest that sales and unifications will never occur––
transactions with sufficient value to overcome the controller’s 
disincentives will still occur. The implication, however, is that 
some inefficient dual-class companies persist in business 
longer than they should, and steps should be taken to prevent 
this through time-based sunset provisions.174 
While some inefficient dual-class companies might be 
eliminated through mandatory time-based sunsets, efficient 
companies would also be lost. The historical record suggests 
that such drastic measures are not necessary to encourage the 
unification or sale of dual-class companies. Only six of 
nineteen companies included in Jeffrey Gordon’s 1988 study175 
of companies adopting dual-class stock structures as takeover 
defense mechanisms are still listed. Of those, three have 
adopted tenure voting, one has collapsed its dual-class 
structure, and only two remain dual-class companies.176 The 
 
173 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, at 613–18. 
174 Bebchuk and Kastiel note that the ISS study cited supra, note 15 
concludes that dual-class companies tend to last twice as long as controlled 
companies with a single class of shares. Id. at 617. 
175 See Gordon, supra note 28. 
176 Among the companies in Gordon’s study that remain public, only 
one still has a dual-class stock structure with unequal voting: The Hershey 
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remainder have been acquired or gone bankrupt. Similarly, 
only eight of forty-three companies included in Partch’s 1987 
study177 of firms that adopted dual-class structures between 
1961 and 1984 remain listed dual-class companies, most of 
which are included in this dual-class data set.178 
More recently, the founders of several of the companies in 
the data set have voluntarily collapsed their dual-class stock 
or sold the company in recent years. The founders of Nu Skin 
Enterprises, for example, voluntarily converted all of their 
high vote shares in 2003. The controlling families of Forest 
City Enterprises and Hubbell Incorporated agreed with 
investor demands to collapse their dual-class structures. The 
founders of Apollo Education Group (owner of University of 
Phoenix), Cablevision, Kayak Software, Molex, and zulily sold 
their companies between 2013 and 2017. 
It is clear companies with dual-class capital structures are 
not impervious to change. Ronald Gilson explained in 2006 
why dual-class share structures fail to persist in inter-
generational contexts:  
“[p]recisely because non-pecuniary private benefits 
are idiosyncratic to the particular controlling 
shareholder and because the identities of controlling 
shareholders change with generations, it is plausible 
to expect changes in the value of the non-pecuniary 
private benefits of control over time . . . [a]t some 
point, the wealth gain from adaptation reflected in a 
large acquisition premium, or an increase in market 
value from giving up control and hiring professional 
 
Company. Two companies have converted from dual-class to single-class 
stock structures: The Gap, Inc. and Lee Enterprises. Three companies, 
American Family, now AFLAC, Inc., Carlisle Companies Incorporated and 
The J.M. Smucker Company have a tenure stock structure. See id. at 79–
85.  
177 See Partch, supra note 28. 
178 The remaining companies include Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc., Bowl 
America Incorporated, The Hershey Company, Kelly Services, Inc., Moog, 
Inc., A. O. Smith Corporation, Watsco, Inc., and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. See 
Partch, supra note 28, at 334–38 tbl.6. 
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managers, outweighs the non-pecuniary private 
benefits of control . . . .”179  
Gilson’s final point applies equally to single generation 
controllers, however. When dual-class controllers conclude 
that returns from the dual-class structure are no longer 
attractive—that is, when their visions have run their course 
and are no longer producing the results the controllers 
anticipated—they convert their shares to low vote common 
shares or sell the company. 
Finally, in some cases it is possible to persuade a 
controlling founder to step-down from leadership if that is in 
the best interests of the company––even if the founder 
controls elections of the directors. The most high-profile recent 
example of a controlling founder stepping away from 
leadership was Travis Kalanick’s resignation as the CEO of 
Uber after being pressured by shareholders to resign.180 
These historic results suggest that it is not necessary to 
resort to time-based sunsets to terminate dual-class share 
structures despite controller incentives to avoid sales and 
unifications. Controllers can be and often are persuaded to 
unify their capital structures or sell their companies. Since 
time-based sunsets do not protect the idiosyncratic vision of 
founders and are not, when other methods are available, 
necessary to protect investors from economic inefficiencies, 
they generally will not be part of an optimal dual-class 
structure.  
2. Dilution and Divestment Sunsets 
Dilution sunsets must be carefully crafted to serve as part 
of an optimal package of sunset provisions. They could 
diminish the creation of corporate value by discouraging 
 
179 Gilson, supra note 11, at 1670–71 (predicting that controlling 
shareholder systems in “good law” countries tend to deteriorate simply from 
the gravity of generations and providing evidence from Sweden). 
180 Katie Benner, Silicon Valley Investors Flexed Their Muscles in Uber 
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entrepreneur-controllers from issuing additional shares to 
obtain capital for growth, incentivize new employees, or 
acquire complementary businesses.181 As noted supra, 
Wasserman has documented that entrepreneurs sometimes 
choose not to take on additional capital in the venture capital 
stages of growth for fear of losing control of their company.182  
One of the costs of becoming a controlling shareholder is 
typically a lower level of investment diversification—the 
controlling stockholder is typically required to invest a 
significant percentage of the controller’s assets in the 
controlled corporation—which acts as a natural disincentive 
to making poor investments of the controlled corporation’s 
assets in a manner that adversely affects the value of the 
company. 
Under the idiosyncratic value theory, the reasons for an 
entrepreneur’s dilution matter. If the entrepreneur’s stake is 
diluted by additional accretive issuances of equity to grow the 
company and realize the above-market returns inherent in the 
entrepreneur’s vision, the entrepreneur should not be 
penalized through loss of control. If the entrepreneur is 
diluted because the entrepreneur is selling interests in the 
corporation in order to diversify investments, that indicates a 
lower level of commitment to the idiosyncratic vision 
embodied by the corporation. Thus, divestment sunsets are a 
better trigger for high vote conversion than dilution sunsets. 
When utilized, divestment sunsets should attempt to quantify 
the point where the entrepreneur’s choice to diversify 
investments through the sale of interests in the company 
indicates an insufficient remaining commitment to the 
 
181 Banerjee and Masulis have explained that controlling shareholders 
may forgo positive net present value (“NPV”) investments to maintain 
control unless they benefit from a dual-class share structure. They note that 
when the NPV of projects that would otherwise have been forgone is higher 
than the takeover premium that would be available to shareholders in an 
unimpeded market for control of the corporation, dual-class structures 
enhance shareholder welfare. Suman Banerjee & Ronald W. Masulis, 
Ownership, Investment and Governance: The Costs and Benefits of Dual 
Class Shares (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
352/2013, 2017). 
182 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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enterprise. At that point, the entrepreneur should lose control 
of the company. Alternatively, companies could use formulas 
to focus on the reasons for dilution and only penalize the 
entrepreneur-controller for divestment. The Snap charter 
does this—focusing on the founder’s ongoing ownership of 
high vote shares as a percentage of the number owned at the 
time of its IPO.183  
3. Death and Incapacity Sunsets 
Death and incapacity sunsets should be included in all 
dual-class charters. The death or incapacity of the founder 
should collapse the capital structure because the founder is no 
longer able to pursue an idiosyncratic vision upon death or 
incapacity. One possible exception is when there are multiple 
co-founders, where the high vote shares could be transferred 
to a co-founder, with the capital structure collapsing upon the 
death or incapacity of the last surviving founder. Another 
possible exception is when employees imbued with the 
idiosyncratic vision of the founder and in a position to carry it 
on hold enough high vote shares to make a material difference 
in corporate voting going forward. In that case, the employees 
should arguably be permitted to retain their control block 
until their own deaths, or as long as they remain employed. 
The death and incapacity provisions should apply to shares 
held by permitted transferees of the original shareholders as 
well as directly by the natural person. This ensures that there 
are no lingering high vote shares being voted by someone 
beyond the death or incapacity of the relevant original holder 
of high vote shares. 
One important purpose of death sunsets is to prevent the 
intergenerational passage of founder control to descendants. 
Investors in founder-controlled enterprises make an implicit 
bargain with the founder at the time of the initial public 
offering that the investors will grant the founder control of the 
enterprise (subject to certain conditions, or not) in exchange 
 
183 Snap, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017), 
exhibit 3.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000 
119312517029199/d270216dex31.htm[https://perma.cc/9UKF-MCDG]. 
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for an equity stake in the enterprise. Essentially, investors are 
betting on the founder. They are willing to take the risk that 
the founder’s vision or management abilities may fail because 
they believe in the founder’s vision and capabilities, which is 
typically demonstrated by the pre-public performance of the 
company and forecasts for its future performance. 
Under purely free market principles, founders should have 
an opportunity to offer investors shares in a company that 
permits intergenerational transfers of control, and investors 
can be held to that bargain when the founder dies. The 
founder is conditioning participation in the above-market 
returns produced by the founder’s enterprise on acceptance of 
the founder’s descendants managing the company after the 
founder’s death. But that bargain is not justified by the need 
to protect the pursuit of the founder’s vision for corporate 
value. Instead, from a macroeconomic perspective, the 
bargain may lead to an unfortunate waste of economic 
resources. Each generation of individuals is likely to have 
different visions and capabilities. Studies have suggested that 
the performance benefits of founder control recede in 
succeeding generations.184 While it is conceivable that new 
generations of the founding family, or managers and 
employees who have worked with the founder for many years, 
would have the same or similar idiosyncratic vision as the 
founder, when investing in a founder-led company, investors 
are investing in the vision of the founder and, sometimes, her 
 
184 Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Francisco Perez-
Gonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families 
in Succession Decisions and Performance, 122 Q.J. ECON. 647, 669–670, 684 
(2007); Gilson, supra note 11, at 1661, 1668; Kastiel, supra note 140, at 118; 
Randall Morck, Andrew Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management 
Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311 (1988) 
(concluding that performance of older firms is worse when the firm is run 
by a member of the founding family); Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How 
Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. 
FIN. ECON. 385, 399–400 (2006); Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon & 
Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and 
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management acumen. The situation is even more egregious 
when the controlling holder is no longer an officer or director 
of the company but seeks to pass control of the company to a 
family member or a favored successor. This situation arose 
recently with Viacom, when Sumner Redstone sought to pass 
control of the company to his daughter.185  
To avoid issues with inheritance of control, investors 
should have an opportunity to vote on whether to extend 
control benefits to a different generation of the founding 
family or another group of individuals to whom the founder 
might consider transferring control. This will essentially 
allow investors to make a bet on a new individual or group of 
managers. In order to allow investors the right to make this 
choice, dual-class companies should consider including death 
and incapacity provisions in their charters in the future. 
4. Separation Sunsets 
Separation sunsets should also be included in all dual-class 
charters. Separation sunsets were included in the 
amendments to the Facebook charter in connection with its 
proposed introduction of non-voting Class C common shares. 
Separation sunsets are consistent with the Goshen and 
Hamdani model of corporate governance: once the founder is 
no longer actively involved in the management of the company 
as an officer or director, the founder cannot reasonably claim 
to be involved in pursuing the idiosyncratic vision for creating 
corporate value that justified the establishment of the dual-
class share structure. The definition of “cause” for purposes of 
the termination clause of the separation sunset should not 
establish a bar that is too high to constitute an effective 
trigger upon the termination of the entrepreneur-controller as 
an executive officer.  
In industries where conviction of a felony would disqualify 
a person from acting as an executive officer of a company, 
sunset provisions should reflect that by making the high vote 
 
185 Keach Hagey, Shari Redstone’s Path to Power, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 
2018, 5:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shari-redstones-path-to-
power-1529659921 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).  
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shares convert to low vote shares upon an entrepreneur-
controller’s final conviction of a disqualifying felony. 
5. Transfer Sunsets 
High vote shares should convert on virtually any transfer, 
with the exception of transfers for tax and estate planning 
purposes. Transfer of high vote shares is inconsistent with the 
creation of such shares to support an entrepreneur’s pursuit 
of an idiosyncratic vision. The vision in which shareholders 
invest is not that of a third-party transferee. Nor is it 
necessary to permit transfers to family members or dynastic 
control to support an entrepreneur’s pursuit of a value 
enhancing idiosyncratic vision. Transfers to family members, 
other high vote shareholders, and entities not exclusively 
owned by the transferor should lead to conversion of the high 
vote shares. Statistical studies have shown that family-
controlled firms controlled by heirs as opposed to the founders 
themselves typically experience a decline in firm 
performance.186  
The permitted entity transfers provision should follow the 
Facebook model, which requires exclusive ownership of the 
relevant entity by the transferor. The Google model, 
permitting transfer when the transferor retains voting and 
dispositive control of the high vote shares, permits sharing the 
benefit of the high vote shares with parties other than the 
founder––which is not necessary to support the founder’s 
pursuit of her vision. The trusts provision should, however, 
follow the Google approach. Charters should specify 
particular types of trusts and require voting and dispositive 
control to remain in the hands of the founder. This approach 
contrasts with the Facebook approach, which permits 
transfers to trusts for which professional trustees or family 
members may act as trustees of the trust, with no reference to 
retained voting and dispositive control by the founder.  
Transfer conversion provisions permitting transfers by 
stockholders that are partnerships and LLCs to their partners 
or members, as the case may be, are also not necessary to 
 
186 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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support a founder’s ability to pursue the idiosyncratic value of 
control and should not be included. Venture capital funds and 
other pre-IPO investors should not receive high vote shares in 
connection with the IPO in any event, unless they continue to 
be actively involved in the enterprise through representation 
on the board of directors of the company, making them 
accountable to public investors. However, transfers to co-
founders are consistent with the pursuit of an idiosyncratic 
vision and should be permitted.  
6. Performance Sunsets 
As discussed previously, the most challenging aspect of the 
theory of idiosyncratic value is that it gives investors little 
opportunity to avoid the agency costs inherent in poor 
business decisions. Goshen and Hamdani are unbending in 
advocating that entrepreneur-controllers should be granted a 
property right in their idiosyncratic vision.187 This means that 
investors may not fire the entrepreneur-controller as manager 
of the corporation even if the idiosyncratic vision leads the 
entrepreneur-controller to make poor business decisions that 
destroy value. 
One way to potentially address the gap between the 
expectations of entrepreneur-controllers and investors would 
be to establish dual-class sunset provisions focused on 
performance measures. A wide variety of performance 
measures could be imagined. The ideal performance sunset 
would focus on a standard under which even the most 
determined entrepreneur-controller would admit that an 
idiosyncratic vision for value creation has clearly failed. A 
sunset might trigger, for example, if revenue, income, or the 
stock price of the company falls below the levels at the time of 
the initial public offering for a significant period of time—
perhaps two or three years. Investors should be prepared to 
be flexible in thinking about performance sunset measures, 
however, as some idiosyncratic visions may take years to 
incubate before they start to succeed. If the parties consider 
measures on a company-by-company basis, rather than seek a 
 
187 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 601–03. 
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one-size-fits-all solution, performance sunsets are a workable 
solution to the entrepreneur-investor control conundrum.  
The challenge with performance sunsets is that the 
entrepreneur-controller acting as manager will have to 
manage the performance of the company in a manner that 
successfully survives the performance tests. This challenge is 
similar to how managers of public companies with dispersed 
ownership engage in earnings management to achieve 
performance goals tied to compensation and in connection 
with insider trading windows.188 Thus, performance sunsets, 
if used, must be carefully designed in order to avoid gaming. 
7. Fiduciary Sunsets 
Another option that investors concerned about agency 
costs can consider is a fiduciary sunset. The concept of a 
fiduciary sunset is simple: if entrepreneur-controllers are 
found to have breached their fiduciary duties to shareholders 
as officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of the 
company, in a manner that is not indemnifiable, consequences 
should impact their control of the corporation. In the context 
of a company with a single class of stock and dispersed 
ownership, such a fiduciary breach by an officer or director 
would typically lead to termination, resignation, or removal 
from office by the shareholders.189 In the context of a dual-
 
188 See Christopher S. Armstrong, David F. Larcker, Gaizka 
Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The Relation Between Equity Incentives and 
Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 327, 327 
(2013); Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, 
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the 
Problems, and How to Fix Them 89 (Harvard Bus. Sch. NOM, Working 
Paper No. 04-28, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 
[https://perma.cc/9T6W-ZZGP]; John Bizjak, Rachel M. Hayes & 
Swaminathan L. Kalpathy, Performance-Contingent Executive 
Compensation and Managerial Behavior 5 (Dec. 10, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519246 [https://perma.cc/3HGA-
ZA3X]. 
189 Ideally, a fiduciary sunset would also cover the obligations of the 
entrepreneur-controller to the public investors as a controlling shareholder. 
There have been several judicial actions where shareholders have 
successfully challenged the control group in a dual-class company. See e.g., 
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class company, the entrepreneur-controller is shielded from 
that result.190 To make the dual-class structure more 
palatable to institutional investors and other public 
stockholders, entrepreneurs wishing to establish a dual-class 
structure might consider incorporating consequences for 
breach of fiduciary duties that impact the entrepreneur-
controller’s control of the corporation. Shareholder concerns 
about control agency risk, and to some extent management 
agency risk, might be ameliorated by such a provision. If the 
entrepreneur-controller is held to have breached a duty of 
care, some kind of sunset of control can kick in. These controls 
can be either a limit to the term of the dual-class structure, or 
a sharing of control. For example, the sunset might cause 
some matters to become subject to minority investor approval. 
D. Additional Protections for Dual-Class Investors 
Sunset provisions may ultimately be insufficient to protect 
investors from the risks of agency costs associated with dual-
class share structures. In addition to sunsets, there are other 
provisions entrepreneur–controllers can incorporate into 
dual-class corporate charters to offer public investors 
additional protection against agency costs without accepting 
the wholesale transfer of control implicated by time-based 
sunset provisions. Among the measures entrepreneur-
controllers can consider offering (and investors can consider 
seeking) are (1) pro rata distribution of consideration upon a 
change of control, (2) a promise to compensate low vote 
shareholders for any charter amendments changing the 
corporate governance structure post-IPO or otherwise 
 
Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating the Pros and Cons of 
Dual-Class Capital Structures, INSIGHTS, Mar. 2013, at 6. (citing Levco 
Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 803 A.2d 428 (Del. 
2002); In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7144–VCG, 2012 WL 
729232, at *14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012)). 
190 While controlling shareholders are not typically subject to 
termination or a loss of control in connection with a breach of fiduciary 
duties to the minority, that still might be a rational resolution to the tension 
between the entrepreneur’s and investors’ competing desires for control of 
the company. 
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adversely affecting the rights of the low vote investors, and (3) 
power-sharing arrangements, which might, for example, (a) 
limit high vote power to certain major corporate decisions—
such as the election of directors and sale of the corporation—
or (b) empower low vote shareholders to vote on equal terms 
with the high vote holders on certain corporate matters, such 
as executive compensation. 
1. Pro Rata Distribution of Change-of-Control 
Consideration 
One significant concern for public investors in controlled 
companies is the prospect of a sale of control or a sale of the 
company creating an uneven distribution of the value of the 
company to the entrepreneur-controller. Control premiums 
have been described as a proxy for private benefits of control 
or even as a proxy for minority expropriation.191 While strict 
transfer conversion sunset provisions can effectively prevent 
a sale of a control position in a dual-class company, they 
cannot prevent private bargaining for separate and better 
consideration in a sale of the company by an entrepreneur-
controller. Goshen and Hamdani suggest that entrepreneur-
controllers are often willing to share the benefits of value 
created through the pursuit of their idiosyncratic visions with 
outside investors pro rata.192 The understanding that all 
investors will benefit pro rata from the proceeds of any sale of 
the corporation can become part of the explicit bargain 
between entrepreneur-controller and public investors at the 
time of the IPO through charter provisions stating that all 
classes of stock will share equally, pro rata, in the proceeds of 
any sale. Alphabet and other companies already have such a 
provision in their charter.193 Both Kevin Plank of Under 
 
191 See e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of 
Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 959–60 (1994). 
192 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 567, 572–73, 576. 
193 In addition to Alphabet, other companies with a merger equity 
provision include Ameresco, Duluth Holdings, Estee Lauder, FitBit, 
Groupon, LinkedIn, MaxLinear, MINDBODY, NCI, News Corp, Nu Skin, 
Ralph Lauren, Reata Pharmaceuticals, Skechers, Square, Tableau 
Software, Trade Desk, Twilio, Under Armour, Wayfair, Workiva, Yelp, and 
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Armor and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook accepted charter 
amendments requiring them to give up control premiums in 
connection with the introduction of no vote stock into the 
companies’ capital structures as a means of perpetuating their 
control of their companies.194  
2. Compensation for Charter Alterations 
Goshen and Hamdani argue that entrepreneur-controllers 
should not be permitted to take advantage of their control 
positions to alter corporate governance structures to their 
advantage after an initial bargain over governance is struck 
in connection with the initial investment in the entrepreneur-
controllers’ enterprises.195 Public investors in low vote shares 
should be protected from such (essentially self-dealing) 
alterations of the implied contract. They argue, however, that 
minority protection should not take the form of an ex ante 
approval right, but rather, an ex-post judicial review of such 
transactions for fairness to public investors. Otherwise, 
holdouts can interfere with the entrepreneur-controller’s 
management rights. The ex-post requirement of fair 
compensation can, however, be incorporated into the charter 
ex ante rather than relying on the varying review standards 
of judicial monitoring. 
As noted by Goshen and Hamdani, in the past, Delaware 
courts have not required shareholders be compensated for 
charter amendments, as long as the changes affect all 
 
Zynga. Andrew William Winden, Dual-Class Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
194 Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 67 (June 2, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116 
000074/facebook2016definitiveprox.htm [https://perma.cc/X5SR-62VP]; 
Under Armour, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (July 13, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000119312515251272/d9
31136ddef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/F42X-3XC3]. 
195 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 608–09 (“A necessary 
element in any minority-protection scheme is, therefore, a protection 
against unilateral, midstream changes to the firm’s governance 
arrangement”); see also Paul Lee, Note, Protecting the Public Shareholders: 
The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 292–93 
(2015). 
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shareholders equally from a legal perspective.196 Entrenching 
effects have not provided a cause for compensation. The 
leading case is Williams v. Geier, in which the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that a controlling shareholder’s vote to 
change the charter to impose a tenure voting system was not 
self-dealing and did not require application of the entire 
fairness doctrine.197 It is possible the Williams case, which is 
now twenty years old, would be decided differently if reviewed 
today—imposing an entire fairness standard of review for 
charter amendments entrenching a controlling shareholder. 
In any event, Goshen and Hamdani argue that investors 
should be protected from efforts by a controller to change the 
mix of control and cash-flow rights mid-stream because an 
initial public offering of minority voting equity to the public 
established an implicit agreement regarding such rights at 
that point in time.198 
Two recent mid-course changes have resulted in 
compensation to shareholders. The founders of both Google 
and Under Armor, after approving charter amendments to 
introduce new classes of non-voting common stock in order to 
preserve their voting control following additional issuances of 
equity, agreed that their company would compensate the 
owners of the new non-voting class for the difference between 
the market price of the non-voting shares and the market 
price of the voting shares.199 Google paid such shareholders 
 
196 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 609.  
197 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1371 (Del. 1996). 
198 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 609. 
199 Google, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 at 7 (Oct. 30, 
2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/00011931251341 
8880/d618226dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/LRD7-4AVE]; Under Armour, 
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1336917/000133691715000040/oc
tober72015form8-k.htm [https://perma.cc/7LYK-QHBK]; Under Armour, 
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approximately $522 million as a result.200 Zillow introduced 
non-voting common shares in connection with charter 
amendments to accommodate its acquisition of Trulia in 2015 
and did not face a class action in connection with its charter 
changes.201 Under Goshen and Hamdani’s rubric, if such 
charter changes had the effect of allowing Zillow’s founders to 
control more of the votes with less of the cash flow rights, the 
founders (not Zillow) should have compensated the other 
shareholders for the change.  
In accepting Google’s settlement of class action litigation 
regarding the introduction of its non-voting shares, then 
Chancellor Strine expressed skepticism about the fact that the 
compensation was to be paid by the company, rather than by 
the founders, the presumptive beneficiaries of the charter 
amendments.202 Strine was also skeptical of the fact that the 
compensation would be paid by the company to all holders of 
the non-voting shares, including the controlling founders.203 
The founders and directors of Facebook and IAC/Interactive 
faced class action lawsuits after similarly approving charter 
amendments to introduce new classes of non-voting common 
stock—in order to perpetuate the founder’s control while 
issuing additional equity (or, in Facebook’s case, while 
divesting a portion of the founder’s cash flow rights)—and 
ultimately had to abandon their efforts.204 Given now-Chief 
 
200 Google, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 at 3 (Apr. 23, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877615 
000021/googq12015exhibit991.htm [https://perma.cc/PMU3-F5R5]. 
201 Zillow Group, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at F-1–14 
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1617640/ 
000119312514339427/d778624ds4.htm#toc778624_138 
[https://perma.cc/ZT43-J7KV]. 
202 Settlement Hearing and Rulings on the Court at 2–4, In Re Google 
Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 6735045 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
28, 2013). 
203 Id. 
204 Queenie Wong, Facebook Drops Stock Plan that Would Have 
Allowed Zuckerberg to Maintain Control, MERCURY NEWS.COM (Sept. 22, 
2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/22/facebook-drops-
stock-plan-that-would-have-allowed-zuckerberg-to-maintain-control/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q893-X237]; Press Release, CalPERS, In Response to 
2018.3_WINDEN_FINAL  
No. 3:852] SUNRISE, SUNSET 935 
Justice Strine’s skepticism about the absence of compensation 
from the controllers to the minority shareholders in the 
Google case, it will be interesting to see what, if any, 
settlement terms emerge from those cases, or how the 
Delaware courts resolve the disputes going forward. In any 
event, for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the 
charters of dual-class companies can include a provision 
requiring controlling shareholder compensation of minority 
shareholders for adverse changes to the terms of the charter. 
As noted above, a more typical provision requiring minority 
shareholder approval would not be consistent with Goshen 
and Hamdani’s view that solutions to minority shareholder 
concerns should not interfere, ex ante, with the controller’s 
right to control the company. 
Of course, the opposite should also be true; where investors 
prevail upon controlling founders to collapse a dual-class 
system into a single class of equal voting shares, the controller 
should be compensated. Studies and experience have shown 
that where both high and low vote (or low and no vote) shares 
of an issuer are listed, the low (or no) vote shares typically 
trade at a three to five percent discount to the price of the 
higher voting shares.205 The no vote shares of Alphabet, Inc. 
have traded at such a discount to the low vote shares of 
Alphabet since they were listed in 2013.206 We can assume, 
therefore, that a discount is incorporated into the price of low 
 




205 Dan Caplinger, What the Google Stock Split Taught Investors About 
Corporate Governance, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 1, 2016, 5:33 PM), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/09/01/what-the-google-stock-split-
taught-investors-about.aspx [https://perma.cc/7PV4-PB9N]; Aaron Stumpf 
& Andrew Cline, Price Differentials Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, 
STOUT, https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/price-differentials-
between-voting-and-nonvoting-stock [https://perma.cc/49G9-8U9K]. 
206 Jesse Emspak, GOOG or GOOGL: Which Stock Do You Buy?, 
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vote shares of a dual-class company listed at the time of its 
initial public offering. That is, public investors benefit from a 
lower initial price, while founders settle for a lower price for 
the shares of their companies than they could obtain if they 
did not retain control through a dual-class structure.207 
When institutional investors insist that the boards of dual-
class companies establish time-based sunset provisions to 
phase out the structure over time so they will have equal 
voting rights in the future, they should understand that they 
are asking for a right they have not paid for. Such 
shareholders should arguably pay a premium to the company 
in connection with receiving equal voting rights in such 
situations. In practice, low vote shareholders have not 
typically paid companies for additional voting rights in 
connection with dual-class reclassifications, but in some cases, 
holders of high vote shares have, appropriately, been 
compensated for their loss of control. For example, when 
Hubbell Inc. reclassified its shares into a single class of voting 
common in 2015, high vote shareholders received a special 
dividend of $200 million.208 When Forest City Enterprises 
collapsed its dual-class structure in 2017, the high vote 
shareholders received a thirty-one percent premium (in 
 
207 When institutional investors say, with respect to high performing 
dual-class companies, that they should have equal voting shares just in case 
things go bad in the future, they are essentially suggesting that the market 
is not properly pricing the risk that such management failures could occur 
in the future. This is an odd result given the extent to which other risks, 
such as the risk of bankruptcy, are perceived to be accurately priced into 
the market values of securities, including high yield bonds. If investors 
believe the risk of poor management performance in the future is not 
properly reflected in the share price of a dual-class company, they ought to 
short the shares. 
208 Hubbell Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) exhibit 99.1 at 2 (Aug. 24, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/48898/ 
000119312515299447/d26695dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/PW2W-7BCD]; 
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common shares) on their high vote shares upon conversion.209 
In both of these cases, the compensation was provided by the 
company rather than other shareholders.210 
3. Selective Power Sharing: Majority of the 
Minority Votes 
Entrepreneur-controllers could agree to obtain majority-of-
the-minority votes with respect to corporate decisions 
otherwise reserved to the managers or the board, in much the 
same way as venture investors holding preferred shares are 
often given voting power with respect to significant corporate 
decisions. This would give the entrepreneur-controller day-to-
day management discretion of the company while giving 
investors some levers to protect their interests. The 
compensation of executives is one matter as to which 
shareholders are already required to be given a non-binding 
vote. Their vote could be made binding. There may be other 
areas in which power-sharing could be considered, such as 
incurrence of debt over certain amounts, acquisitions over a 
certain value, or other significant corporate decisions. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
There is a fundamental tension, or tradeoff, between 
entrepreneurs’ freedom to pursue idiosyncratic visions for 
value creation and investors’ need for protection from agency 
costs. This tension is particularly acute in the context of dual-
class companies, where the entrepreneur’s uncontestable and 
indefinite control, coupled with the entrepreneur’s smaller 
equity interest, leaves investors with comparatively high 
exposure to agency costs. It is not surprising, then, that 
institutional investors have responded to recent increases in 
the number of dual-class IPOs with calls for prohibition, 
 
209 Forest City Realty Tr., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) exhibit 3.1 
at 7 (June 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1647509/ 
000119312517201428/d411995dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/M2MP-RXJS]. 
210 Arguably, low vote shareholders should be paying high vote 
shareholders directly for the acquisition of control rights. 
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termination or strict limitation, while entrepreneurs and their 
lawyers insist on maintaining the private ordering status quo. 
A thorough review of the terms of dual-class stock 
structures reveals that the tension between entrepreneurs 
and institutional investors over control of emerging 
companies can be resolved through careful drafting of 
corporate charters to reflect the fundamental bargain between 
the parties––money for vision––and the interests underlying 
their respective bids for control: security from interference or 
dismissal for the entrepreneur and opportunity for voice and 
influence for investors. When the terms of dual-class share 
structures are considered in detail, we can identify creative 
ways to give entrepreneurs the control they seek—for as long 
as they want it, in a manner that does not compromise 
accountability—and incentivize careful stewardship of 
corporate assets. Given the diversity among entrepreneurs 
and companies in terms of vision, execution, industry, and 
competition, this is not a one-size-fits-all exercise. While in 
some cases it should be possible to negotiate a set of sunset 
provisions that satisfy investor concerns, in other cases it may 
be necessary to resort to sunrise provisions that enhance 
investor influence, such as a public investor right to nominate 
and elect a minority of the board of directors. 
As noted in Part V, law firms advising companies pursuing 
initial public offerings have tremendous influence in 
determining the terms of dual-class stock structures. If, as 
suggested by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati’s response to 
institutional investor calls for prohibition or strict limitation 
of dual-class stock structures, such firms wish to preserve the 
current system of private ordering in designing such stock 
structures, they have a responsibility to be more creative and 
proactive in designing structures that respond more 
effectively to investors’ concerns while retaining founders’ 
ability to pursue their visions for value creation without 
undue interference or dismissal. As explained in Part VII, 
there are many different ways to approach that effort. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Dual-Class Data Set Companies Listed by Dual-
Class Adoption or Listing Year 
 
2017 
ACM Research, Inc. 




Blue Apron Holdings, Inc. 
CarGurus, Inc. 
Carvana Co. 
Hamilton Lane, Inc. 
Laureate Education, Inc. 
MuleSoft, Inc. 
Newmark Group, Inc. 
Okta, Inc. 
Roku, Inc. 
Schneider National, Inc. 
Snap, Inc. 






Reata Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Red Rock Resorts, Inc. 
SecureWorks Corp. 






Duluth Holdings, Inc. 
First Data Corp. 
Fitbit, Inc. 
Houlihan Lokey, Inc. 
Inovalon Holdings, Inc. 
MINDBODY, Inc. 
Pure Storage, Inc. 
RMR Group, Inc. 
Square, Inc. 
Summit Materials, Inc. 
Virtu Financial, Inc. 
 
2014 
Castlight Health, Inc. 
Fifth Street Asset 
Management, Inc. 
GoPro, Inc. 
Medley Management, Inc. 
Moelis & Company 
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2013 
Coty, Inc. 
Fairway Group Holdings 
Corp. 
News Corp. 
(Spin-off from old News 
Corp.) 
Re/Max Holdings, Inc. 
RingCentral, Inc. 
Tableau Software, Inc. 
Veeva Systems, Inc. 
William Lyon Homes 
zulily, Inc. 




Globus Medical, Inc. 
Kayak Software, Inc. 





AMC Networks, Inc. 
(Spin-off from Cablevision) 
Groupon, Inc. 
(Sunset in 2016) 
LinkedIn Corp. 
TripAdvisor, Inc. 
Zillow Group, Inc. 







Madison Square Garden Co., 
The 
(Spin-off from Cablevision) 
MaxLinear, Inc. 
(Sunset in 2017) 
Swift Transportation Company 
2009 













Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, 
Inc. 
2005 




(initially Google, Inc.) 
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Molson Coors Brewing Co. 
NCI, Inc. 
Under Armour, Inc. 
Viacom, Inc. 
(Spin-off from CBS 
Corporation) 
 
DreamWorks Animation SKG, 
Inc. 
Marchex, Inc. 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc. 
(Sunset in 2009) 
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. 





Nexstar Media Group, Inc. 
2002 
Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. 
ManTech International Corp. 






Skechers U.S.A., Inc. 




Federated Investors, Inc. 
 
1997 
Ralph Lauren Corp. 
1996 
Genesee & Wyoming, Inc. 
IAC/InterActive Corp. 
(Listed in 1992) 
Lamar Advertising Co. 
Lennar Corp. 
Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc. 
 
1995 
Boston Beer, Inc., The 
DISH Networks, Inc. 
Estee Lauder Companies Inc., 
The 
MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. 
1994 
Apollo Education Group, Inc. 
(Acquired in 2016) 
Erie Indemnity Co. 
 
1991 





(Sunset in 1997) 
Tootsie Roll Industries 
(Listed in 1922) 
1986 
Cablevision Systems Corp. 
(Acquired in 2016) 
CBS Corp. 
(Initially, Viacom, Inc.) 
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Meredith Corporation 
(Listed in 1978) 
 
1984 




A.O. Smith Corporation 
1982 
John Wiley & Sons 
(Listed in 1962) 
1980 
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. 
(Listed in 1966) 
Nike, Inc. 
Universal Health Services, Inc. 
 
1981 








Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 
(Converted to Forest City 
Realty Trust in 2016; 
converted to single class in 
2017) 
Hershey Co., The 
Tyson Foods, Inc. 
 
1973 




(Acquired in 2013) 
 
1971 
Graham Holdings Co. 
(IPO as Washington Post 
Company) 
1967 





Ford Motor Co. 
1936 
Hubbell, Inc. 
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earlier 28  8 7  1 44 
2000        
2001 1      1 
2002 2   1   3 
2003   1 1   2 
2004 4    1  5 
2005 5  1    6 
2006   1    1 
2007 1  1    2 
2008 2      2 
2009   1    1 
2010 2 1  1 1  5 
2011 3 1 2    6 
2012 1 1 2  2  6 
2013 3 2 1 2 1  9 
2014 2  4 1  1 8 
2015 3 2 7  1  13 
2016 2 1 2 1 1 1 8 
2017 3 2 5 2 5  17 
 
Total 62 10 36 16 12 3 139 
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Figures in parenthesis show where shares held by permitted transferees also convert. 
 
*Two companies had both provisions for conversion of shares upon holder death and collapse of 
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E. Companies Listing Both High- and Low-Vote 
Shares 
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. 
Brown-Forman, Inc. 
CBS Corp. 
Constellation Brands, Inc. 
Discovery Communications, Inc. 
Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 
HEICO Corp. 
Hubbell, Inc. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
Molson Coors Brewing Co. 
Molex, Inc.  
News Corp 
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. 
Viacom, Inc. 
Watsco, Inc. 
F. Dual-Class Data Set Companies with Time-Based 
Sunsets 
ACM Research, Inc., listed 2017 (five years) 
Altair Engineering, Inc., listed 2017 (twelve years) 
Alteryx, Inc., listed 2017 (ten years) 
Apptio, Inc., listed 2016 (seven years) 
Castlight Health, Inc., listed 2014 (ten years) 
Fitbit, Inc., listed 2015 (twelve years) 
Groupon, Inc., listed 2011 (five years) 
Hamilton Lane, Inc., listed 2017 (ten years) 
Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc., listed 2010 (eight or 
twenty-eight years) 
Kayak Software Corporation, listed 2012 (seven years) 
MaxLinear, Inc., listed 2010 (seven years) 
MINDBODY, Inc., listed 2015 (seven years) 
MuleSoft, Inc., listed 2017 (five years) 
Nutanix, Inc., listed 2016 (seventeen years) 
Okta, Inc., listed 2017 (ten years) 
Pure Storage, Inc., listed 2015 (ten years) 
Re/Max Holdings, Inc., listed 2013 (five years) 
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RingCentral, Inc., listed 2015 (seven years)  
Rockwell Automation, Inc., listed 1987 (ten years)  
Stitch Fix, Inc., listed 2017 (10 years) 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc., listed 2004 (five years) 
Twilio, Inc., listed 2016 (seven years)  
Veeva Systems, Inc., listed 2013 (ten years)  
Workday, Inc., listed 2012 (twenty years)  
Yelp, Inc., listed 2012 (seven years)   
G. Dual-Class Data Set Companies with Both Death 
and Incapacity Sunset Triggers 
Altair Engineering, Inc. 
Apptio, Inc. 
Bandwidth, Inc. 
Blue Apron Holdings, Inc. 
Box, Inc. 
Fairway Group Holdings Corp. 
Groupon, Inc. 
Laureate Education, Inc. 
LinkedIn Corp. 
MINDBODY, Inc. 




RMR Group, Inc. 
Square, Inc. 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc. 
Tilly’s Inc. 
Twilio, Inc. 
Under Armour, Inc. 
Veeva Systems, Inc. 
Workday, Inc. 
Yelp, Inc. 
Zillow, Inc. 
zulily, Inc. 
Zynga, Inc. 
 
